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199 
ANTIBIOTIC MAXIMALISM: LEGISLATIVE 
ASSAULTS ON THE EVIDENCE-BASED 
TREATMENT OF LYME DISEASE 
INTRODUCTION 
Antibiotics, and the deadly pathogens that have evolved to resist them, 
are one of the major public health concerns of our time. The introduction 
of penicillin in the early 1940s signaled a new era—not only for the 
treatment of devastating infections,
1
 but also for the out-witting of 
antibiotics by fast-evolving bacteria.
2
 If the middle of the twentieth 
century saw the era of antibiotic innovation,
3
 the past several years might 
be labeled the era of antibiotic resistance, when untreatable infections have 
become a modern scourge.
4
 Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) is the most notorious antibiotic resistant ―superbug‖;5 this 
antibiotic-resistent pathogen has emerged as an endemic problem in 
hospital and long-term care settings.
6
 In 2011, bills were introduced in 
both houses of Congress
7
 to encourage the development of new antibiotics 
to replace those that have become ineffective.
8
 Yet, unless or until a truly 
 
 
 1. See generally Kenneth B. Raper, A Decade of Antibiotics in America, 44 MYCOLOGIA 1 
(1952). 
 2. Harold C. Neu, The Crisis in Antibiotic Resistance, 257 SCI. 1064, 1064–65 (1991). Within 
three years of the introduction of penicillin-G in 1941, Staphylococccus aureus (the agent of ―staph‖ 
infections) had already evolved resistance to that antibiotic. Id. The effects of the antibiotic era on 
bacterial evolution are truly striking; in 1941 ―virtually all strains‖ of S. aureus could be killed by 
penicillin. Id. Only 50 years later, in 1991, 95% of S. aureus worldwide were resistant to the drug. Id. 
 3. See Raper, supra note 1. 
 4. See Gary Taubes, The Bacteria Fight Back, 321 SCI. 356, 356 (2008) (―The last decade has 
seen the inexorable proliferation of a host of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, or bad bugs, not just MRSA 
but other insidious players as well, including Acinetobacter baumannii, Enterococcus faecium, 
Klebsiella pneumoniae, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Enterobacter species.‖). 
 5. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., The Spread of the Superbugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2010, at WK12 (citing the fact that MRSA kills more Americans annually than AIDS). 
 6. Eili Klein et al., Hospitalizations and Deaths Caused by Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999–2005, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1840, 1840 
(Dec. 2007), available at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/13/12/07-0629_article.htm. 
 7. Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act of 2011, H.R. 2182, 112th Cong. (2011); 
S. 1734, 112th Cong. (2011). The GAIN Act was enacted, with amendments, as Title VIII of the Food 
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 
(2012). 
 8.  Press Release, House Members Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Combat the Rise of Drug 
Resistant Infections (June 15, 2011), available at http://gingrey.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle 
.aspx?DocumentID=246729 (―There are some issues so important they transcend politics-as-usual. 
Protecting American families from deadly infections is certainly one of them, which is why my 
colleagues and I are introducing the GAIN Act. With this legislation, we hope to ensure that new drugs 
will be available to combat the rising numbers of antibiotic-resistant bugs that threaten Americans in 
hospitals, on the battlefield, in their homes, and in our schools.‖). 
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―miracle‖ antibiotic (i.e., one which may not be resisted by bacteria) is 
someday developed, the only solution to antibiotic resistance is to reduce 
the use of antibiotics.
9
 
Surprisingly, amidst public-health efforts to prevent antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens by reining in excessive antibiotic use,
10
 several states have 
passed laws that legitimize intensive antibiotic regimens even when those 
regimens contradict the best available medical evidence.
11
 Although this 
unprecedented legislative activity has occurred in the context of a 
controversial medical diagnosis, chronic Lyme disease, the legal and 
political repercussions threaten the established role of state medical 
licensing boards in promoting evidence-based standardization of medical 
practice. The most intrusive of these statutes
12
 prevents state licensing 
boards from disciplining physicians who prescribe regimens of long-term 
antibiotic therapy that are specifically proscribed by mainstream clinical 
practice guidelines (CPGs) on Lyme disease treatment.
13
 Such laws 
promote the view of non-standard practitioners
14
 who favor the intensive, 
maximalist
15
 use of antibiotics for a condition that mainstream physicians 
 
 
 9. Taubes, supra note 4, at 361 (noting that one expert calls such a miracle antibiotic a 
―‗laughable‘ notion‖).  
 10. The CDC provides three fundamental guidelines for curtailing antibiotic resistance: (1) ―Only 
prescribe antibiotic therapy when likely to be beneficial to the patient,‖ (2) ―Use an agent targeting the 
likely pathogens,‖ and (3) ―Use the antibiotic for the appropriate dose and duration.‖ Antibiotic 
Resistance Questions & Answers, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/getsmart/antibiotic-use/anitbiotic-
resistance-faqs.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 11. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 12. State legislative responses to this debate have taken a variety of forms, from inaction to 
resolutions to statutes. See infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. This Note will focus most of its 
attention on laws in California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island that specifically bar 
discipline of physicians for defying mainstream practice guidelines. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 2234.1 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-14m (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12DD 
(West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.5-4 (West 2011). 
 13. The mainstream clinical practice guidelines on the treatment of Lyme Disease were 
developed by the Infectious Disease Society of America (IDSA). Gary P. Wormser et al., The Clinical 
Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention of Lyme Disease, Human Granulocytic Anaplasmosis, and 
Babesiosis: Clinical Practice Guidelines by the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 43 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1089 (2006) [hereinafter IDSA Guidelines]. IDSA publishes CPGs on treating a 
variety of infections. See IDSA, PRACTICE GUIDELINES, http://www.idsociety.org/IDSA_Practice_ 
Guidelines (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 14. The International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society (ILADS), the primary organization 
for the promotion of alternative diagnoses and treatments for Lyme disease, publishes its own 
treatment guidelines. As is explored in more detail below, the ILADS guidelines contradict the IDSA 
guidelines in many respects, including in their advocacy of long-term antibiotic therapy and other 
controversial treatments. See Daniel Cameron et al., The International Lyme and Associated Diseases 
Society: Evidence-based Guidelines of the Management of Lyme Disease, 2 EXPERT REV. ANTI-
INFECTIVE THERAPY, no. 1 (2004) [hereinafter ILADS Guidelines]. 
 15. The enthusiastic attitude toward clinical antibiotic use that is championed by (among others) 
many non-standard Lyme disease practitioners, is referred to herein as antibiotic maximalism. See 
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dispute even exists.
16
 In an attempt to protect unnecessary antibiotic 
regimens, recent legislation legitimizes a treatment paradigm that poses an 
undue risk of harm to individual patients
17
 and to the public health.
18
 
By enacting laws that protect and legitimize repudiated treatments, 
state legislatures have responded to a movement of non-standard ―Lyme 
literate medical doctors‖ (LLMDs)19—a movement that has been 
described as an ―antiscience‖ and ―parallel universe of pseudoscientific 
practitioners‖ by mainstream practitioners.20 In addition, by interfering 
with the legal authority of state medical boards to enforce evidence-based 
standards on antibiotic use, states have also sided with a fringe movement 
of physicians
21
 who oppose the ―encroachment‖ of third-parties,22 
including the government, upon the physician-patient relationship.
23
 These 
advocates decry the influence of evidence-based clinical guidelines and 
state medical licensing boards on the medical practice.
24
 Removing the 
power of state regulators to discipline physicians for dangerous, non-
standard Lyme disease treatment is perceived as an opening salvo in the 
attack on the legitimacy of state medical oversight.
25
 
 
 
infra Part I.B.3. 
 16. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 17. See infra Part IV.A. 
 18. See infra Part IV.C. 
 19. Paul G. Auwaerter et al., Antiscience and Ethical Concerns Associated with Advocacy of 
Lyme Disease, 11 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 713, 714 (2011). 
 20. Id. at 714. 
 21. A prominent voice in this movement is the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons 
(AAPS), which ―has exerted vocal influence in the country‘s health care debate, despite having just 
3,000 dues-paying members.‖ Barry Meier, Vocal Physicians Group Renews Health Law Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011, at B3 (noting that the group‘s ―scientific views often fall outside medicine‘s 
mainstream‖ and citing their publication of studies that link vaccines to autism and abortions to breast 
cancer). The AAPS has supported litigation fighting various provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. See Motion of Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. and Alliance for 
Natural Health USA to Intervene as Respondents, Dept. Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-
398 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2011). The AAPS advocates for other conservative public health positions, including 
a recent suit filed against the FDA attempting to vacate the agency‘s decision to allow over-the-
counter sales of emergency contraceptive to individuals over the age of 18. Ass‘n of Am. Physicians & 
Surgeons v. FDA, 358 F. App‘x 179 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming lower court‘s dismissal based on 
plaintiff‘s lack of standing), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1062 (2011). 
 22. Press Release, Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., AAPS Comments on 
IDSA Lyme Guidelines (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/lyme-disease-
guidelines-comments.php [hereinafter AAPS Comments on IDSA Lyme Disease Guidelines]. 
 23. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Quackery, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 349 (2005). Mehlman 
blames ―anti-regulatory, neo-conservative economic philosophy‖ for ―creat[ing] conditions conducive 
to modern quackery.‖ Id. at 352–53 (citing Republican efforts to pass legislation ―that would broaden 
the ability of licensed health care professionals to treat patients with alternative approaches,‖ such as 
the Access to Medical Treatment Act, H.R. 2085, 108th Cong. (2003)). 
 24. See AAPS Comments on IDSA Lyme Disease Guidelines, supra note 22. 
 25. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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Part I of this Note describes clinical practice guidelines generally, 
including their legal implications, before describing the conflict between 
two competing Lyme disease treatment guidelines. Part II examines the 
political and legal debates that have led to state discipline-preemption 
statutes. Part III analyzes how new state laws in this area (hereinafter 
LLMD-protection laws) promote the maximalist use of antibiotics 
championed by non-standard practitioners. Part IV is a discussion of the 
ramifications of LLMD-protection laws. Though such legislation has 
mostly been limited to the geographic regions most affected by Lyme 
disease,
26
 similar laws have been advocated in other states
27
 as non-
standard Lyme disease practice becomes a nationwide phenomenon.
28
 
These statutes demonstrate the irrational policies that may result from the 
politicization of medical science. By repudiating evidence-based clinical 
practice guidelines, states have put patients at risk of receiving dangerous 
and unnecessary treatment. Furthermore, by precluding state regulators 
from disciplining certain maximalist uses of antibiotics, LLMD-protection 
laws undermine a potentially important tool in the fight against antibiotic 
resistance. Part V offers a few concluding remarks. 
I. CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER LYME 
DISEASE TREATMENT 
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that neither the legal 
nor the scientific discussions of Lyme disease are grounded in absolutes. 
Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) are not definitive statements of the 
standard of care required of physicians, but rather voluntary 
recommendations that are, ideally, based in the best-available evidence.
29
 
Meanwhile, state medical licensing statutes provide that physicians may 
be disciplined for vaguely defined offenses such as ―unprofessional 
conduct.‖30 And, as in any medical field, our scientific understanding of 
Lyme disease will continue to evolve.  
 
 
 26. Government statistics indicate that Lyme disease is concentrated in the northeastern and 
upper-Midwestern regions of the United States. CDC, Reported Cases of Lyme Disease—United 
States 2010, available at http://www.cdc.gov/lyme/resources/ReportedCasesofLymeDisease.pdf. 
 27. See infra notes 163, 165 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., Complaint at 3-6, State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Ryser, No. 09-
1693 (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm‘n 2009) (alleging that a Missouri physician provided harmful, non-
standard Lyme disease care to a patient, including excessive antibiotic therapy); Trine Tsouderos, 
Lyme Doc Has Been Disciplined in Two States, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2011, at 1 (reporting on the 
disciplinary actions taken against a non-standard Lyme practitioner in Iowa and Illinois).  
 29. See infra note 41. 
 30. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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Nevertheless, statutes that legitimize diagnoses and treatments that are 
repudiated by evidence-based medical guidelines challenge the assumption 
that evidence-based medicine can withstand the pressures of the 
democratic process. This is a significant revelation, as evidence-based 
medicine is a cornerstone of modern proposals to reform the healthcare 
system.
31
  
The political and legal controversies surrounding Lyme disease 
treatment are rooted in an intraprofessional disagreement between 
mainstream and non-standard clinicians over the proper use of antibiotics 
to treat Lyme disease. In no small part, this disagreement is a product of a 
movement among some physicians and their patients who, for a variety of 
reasons, resist the modern drive toward standardization in medical 
practice, particularly by CPGs.
32
 This Part first provides an overview of 
CPGs and their legal significance. Next, this Part examines two conflicting 
CPGs for Lyme disease treatment, from the mainstream and non-standard 
physician communities, respectively. Though it is a simplification to 
portray the Lyme treatment controversy as a binary one, the competing 
Lyme disease CPGs have become a significant point of contention among 
advocates and politicians in states that have passed legislation favoring 
non-standard practitioners. 
A. Clinical Practice Guidelines Generally 
Standardization of medical practice has been a goal throughout the 
modern era, aimed at ameliorating variability in medical practice.
33
 A key 
vehicle for standardization in modern practice is the CPG,
34
 which is 
 
 
 31. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1734 (2011) (―[I]mprovement of health care generally requires system-
wide improvements—reducing medical practice variation by figuring out what works, synthesizing 
these findings into clinical practice guidelines and best practices, and then applying them to ensure 
effective treatments.‖). 
 32. See AAPS Comments on IDSA Lyme Disease Guidelines, supra note 22 (―It is each 
physician, and often only the physician, who knows the patient‘s history, course of illness, severity of 
presentation, and responsiveness to treatment. AAPS objects to any curtailment of individualized 
treatment of patients by competent physicians, and no Guidelines should be adopted that infringe on 
such treatment.‖). 
 33. STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE CHALLENGE OF 
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE 14–16 (2003) (citing CPG‘s 
and evidence based-medicine, as the solution, historically, to ―the lack of scientific working habits in 
the health care field.‖). 
 34. George Weisz et al., The Emergence of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 85 MILBANK Q. 691, 
692 (2007) (―[T]he proliferation of collectively produced guidelines since the 1980s represents a 
growing effort to bring order and coherence to a rapidly expanding and heterogenous medical 
domain.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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designed to summarize the best available evidence and recommend 
courses of action to practicing physicians.
35
 Modern CPGs, such as the 
IDSA Guidelines on Lyme disease treatment,
36
 are ―consensus statements‖ 
of the appropriate therapy or medical response to a particular set of 
symptoms.
37
 Intended to summarize the best available evidence for the 
clinician, CPGs provide ―an evaluation of the quality of the relevant 
scientific literature and an assessment of the likely benefits and harms of a 
particular treatment.‖38 CPGs are developed by a diverse array of parties, 
including professional medical societies, health insurance companies, and 
the government.
39
 CPGs promulgated by professional societies, in 
particular, ―are regarded as highly authoritative.‖40  
CPGs are voluntary by nature.
41
 In general, the real effect of CPGs on 
physician behavior has been questioned by some commentators.
42
 The 
application of CPGs by certain third parties, however, may bolster the 
impact of CPGs on clinical decision-making. In particular, CPGs may be 
used (1) by health insurers (to determine whether a therapy will be 
reimbursed by health insurance);
43
 (2) by the courts, as evidence of the 
―standard of care‖ (applied to physicians in malpractice suits and to health 
insurers when a plaintiff challenges a denial of insurance coverage);
44
 and 
(3) by state licensing boards when they enforce professional standards 
prescribed by statute.
45
 
 
 
 35. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REPORT BRIEF: CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST, 
Mar. 2011 [hereinafter IOM REPORT BRIEF], available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-
Practice-Guidelines-We-Can-Trust (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 36. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
 37. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 647 (2001). 
 38. IOM REPORT BRIEF, supra note 35, at 1. 
 39. Mello, supra note 37, at 650. 
 40. Id. (citing ―both physicians‘ expertise and the fact that, unlike insurers, physicians‘ financial 
incentives traditionally have been aligned with providing top-quality care to their patients.‖). 
 41. TIMMERMANS & BERG, supra note 33, at 20–21 (―While third parties might try to enforce 
standards through sanctions, a distinguishing characteristic of standards is that, in comparison to laws 
and directives, they remain [an] impersonal and voluntary means of regulation.‖). 
 42. See, e.g., Stefan Timmermans, From Autonomy to Accountability: The Role of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines in Professional Power, 48 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 490, 494 (2005) 
(suggesting that the standardizing effect of CPGs has been lower than expected).  
 43. See infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 44. Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidenced-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical 
Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 327, 331 (noting that the issues at stake in cases 
against doctors and insurance companies are increasingly intertwined, applying the same standard of 
―quality of care‖ traditionally reserved for malpractice cases: ―With growing frequency, suits are filed 
claiming that the quality of care was inadequate because benefits owed under the plaintiff‘s health plan 
were withheld, either with or without the plaintiff‘s knowledge at the time.‖). 
 45. See infra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
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First, the most important impact of CPGs may be on the reimbursement 
policies of health insurers. When health insurers or managed-care 
providers use guidelines to decide whether to reimburse patients for a 
particular intervention, such decisions undoubtedly affect clinical 
practice.
46
 The controversy over Lyme disease itself reflects the impact of 
CPGs on insurance reimbursements. As is explored in more detail, infra, 
the perceived impact of CPGs on insurance reimbursement decisions
47
 has 
fueled legal and political action against the authors of the mainstream 
Lyme disease CPG, who have been accused of colluding with insurance 
companies.
48
 
Second, CPGs may impact medical decision-making when they are 
used to establish the legal standard of care, either in the physician 
malpractice or insurance coverage setting. The status of CPGs as evidence 
in malpractice and insurance coverage cases is still evolving.
49
 Several 
considerations suggest that a CPG alone will be unlikely to provide the 
standard of care applied in a malpractice trial. For a court to apply a CPG 
directly to the legal standard would likely require legislation, as it would 
depart substantially from the traditional standard based in professional 
custom.
50
 However, CPGs may be used indirectly to establish professional 
standards; guidelines may be the basis of expert testimony establishing 
―what the relevant custom is in a particular set of circumstances‖ (i.e. the 
legal standard for malpractice).
51
  
Commentators have argued against the use of CPGs to set malpractice 
standards of care because of the difficulty in assessing the reliability of a 
particular CPG.
52
 However, the impact of a CPG, especially one 
 
 
 46. Evidence supporting or contraindicating the use of a therapy in a certain clinical context may 
influence the insurance provider‘s decision to reimburse for that therapy. Earl P. Steinberg & Bryan R. 
Luce, Evidence Based? Caveat Emptor!, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 80, 89 (2005). As a result, ―voluntary, 
flexible guidelines are more likely to become normative . . . . Physicians are hired, compensated, 
disciplined, and terminated by provider organizations based on their adherence to guidelines.‖ 
TIMMERMANS & BERG, supra note 33, at 104 (citations omitted) (citing, in particular, health insurance 
reimbursements that are conditioned upon utilization review, a system of retrospective analysis of 
treatment decisions). 
 47. See infra Part III.D. 
 48. See infra Part II.A. 
 49. Rosoff, supra note 44, at 335. 
 50. Id. at 339; see also Maxwell J. Mehlman, Medical Practice Guidelines as Malpractice Safe 
Harbors: Illusion or Deceit?, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 286–87 (2012) (commenting on state 
legislation in this area). The traditional legal standard states that physicians must ―possess and exercise 
that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of 
their profession under similar circumstances.‖ 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and other 
Healers § 188 (2011). 
 51. Mello, supra note 37, at 660. 
 52. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 50, at 291–98; Mello, supra note 37, at 648. 
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promulgated by a respected professional group,
53
 might be a significant 
factor in establishing customary practice. Furthermore, arguments that 
courts should ―ease, or at least not impede, the adoption of evidence-based 
practices by clinicians and health plans‖ generally favor the expanded 
application of CPGs.
54
 
Third, application of a CPG by state medical regulators may convert 
otherwise voluntary guidelines into a legal mandate.
55
 State medical 
licensing statutes provide broad authority to medical boards to discipline 
physicians for their professional misconduct, including by suspension or 
revocation of the physician‘s license to practice.56 Some licensing statutes 
include within the definition of professional misconduct (or 
―unprofessional conduct‖) the departure from prevailing standards of 
medical practice.
57
 Licensing statutes may explicitly direct medical boards 
to consider relevant CPGs when determining the prevailing practice 
standards.
58
 In addition, a CPG may be deployed more informally, as an 
auxiliary indicator of acceptable professional conduct.
59
 Actual practice 
aside, a majority of clinicians believe that CPGs may influence 
professional disciplinary decisions.
60
 And, the perception among non-
 
 
 53. See Mello, supra note 37, at 650 (―CPGs developed by professional medical societies are 
regarded as highly authoritative, due to both physicians' expertise and the fact that, unlike insurers, 
physicians' financial incentives traditionally have been aligned with providing top-quality care to their 
patients.‖). 
 54. See Clark C. Havighurst et al., Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law (Summary 
of the 10 April 2000 IOM and AHRQ Workshop, ―Evidence‖: Its Meanings and Uses in Law, 
Medicine, and Health Care), 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 195, 209 (2001). 
 55. For the purposes of this Note, the regulatory effect of state professional licensing is 
emphasized; accreditation and certification of providers are other mechanisms of regulating medical 
practice. Richard S. Saver, In Tepid Defense of Population Health: Physicians and Antibiotic 
Resistance, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 431, 469 n.232 (2008). 
 56. E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2220 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-13c (West 
2011); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6503 (McKinney 2011). 
 57. E.g., 63 PA. STAT. ANN § 422.41(8) (West 2011) (―Unprofessional conduct shall include 
departure from or failing to conform to an ethical or quality standard of the profession‖); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 90-14 (West 2011) (defining ―[u]nprofessional conduct‖ as the ―departure from, or the 
failure to conform to, the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice.‖) North Carolina 
makes a specific exception for ―experimental,‖ ―nontraditional‖ or otherwise unconventional therapy 
―unless, by competent evidence, the Board can establish that the treatment has a safety risk greater 
than the prevailing treatment or that the treatment is generally not effective.‖ Id. 
 58. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-117(bb)(II) (West 2011) (―In determining which activities 
and practices are not consistent with the standard of care or are contrary to recognized standards of the 
practice of medicine, the board shall utilize, in addition to its own expertise, the standards developed 
by recognized and established accreditation or review organizations that meet requirements established 
by the board by rule.‖). See, e.g., 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 422.41(8)(ii) (West 2011). 
 59. See, e.g., infra note 149 and accompanying text (describing a reference to the mainstream 
Lyme disease treatment recommendations in a disciplinary case, in which the guidelines were cited as 
―the standard treatment‖). 
 60. It is unclear how extensive is the effect of CPGs on medical board disciplinary decisions. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2012] ANTIBIOTIC MAXIMALISM 207 
 
 
 
 
standard physicians, in particular, is that their conduct puts them at risk of 
being disciplined under ―unprofessional conduct‖ laws.61 
B. The Controversy over Lyme Disease Treatment Guidelines 
Legislative intervention in the regulatory oversight of Lyme disease 
treatment, the focus of this Note, is rooted in a controversy between 
competing clinical philosophies. The controversy surrounding Lyme 
disease treatment has pitted a grass-roots movement of patients and 
practitioners (who champion the autonomy of the treating physician) 
against evidence-based standards promulgated by mainstream 
professionals (the authors of the mainstream CPG on Lyme disease 
treatment).  
Several characteristics have made the Lyme disease controversy 
particularly heated. Some skepticism toward mainstream physicians 
originates in the perception that they under-diagnose Lyme disease, 
unintentionally
62
 or even intentionally.
63
 Such negative perceptions of 
mainstream physicians are advanced by self-styled ―Lyme-literate MDs‖ 
(LLMDs),
64
 who advance the notion, in contradiction of the scientific 
evidence, that many Lyme infections persist beyond the recommended 
antibiotic regimen, which lasts less than one month.
65
 Further, LLMDs 
advocate the unfounded position that Lyme disease is responsible for a 
host of subjective, difficult-to-measure symptoms, such as generalized 
pain, fatigue, and cognitive problems.
66
 Confronted with patients who test 
 
 
Suggestively, however, a majority of clinicians believe that CPGs may influence professional 
disciplinary decisions. See Sean R. Tunis et al., Internists’ Attitudes About Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 956, 960 tbl.4 (1994) (indicating that 68% of physicians 
surveyed thought CPGs were ―[l]ikely to be used in physician discipline‖). 
 61. See MICHAEL H. COHEN, COMPLIMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: LEGAL 
BOUNDARIES AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 87 (1998). 
 62. This perception is even perpetuated by at least one state‘s health department. See Seeking 
Care for Lyme Disease, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, http://www.health 
.state.ri.us/diseases/lyme/about/seekingmedicalcare/ (―If you have Lyme, or think you might have 
Lyme, it is important that you learn about the disease and have a physician who is educated about 
Lyme. Many people with Lyme disease have been misdiagnosed or not diagnosed at all because they 
did not understand their symptoms and saw physicians who are unfamiliar with the disease. Rhode 
Island law protects Lyme disease patients by ensuring that they can receive proper treatment and that 
their insurance companies cover that treatment.‖). 
 63. See Auwaerter et al., supra note 19, at 714 (2011) (―By the early 1990s, some activist groups 
. . . were accusing university scientists and public health officials of intentionally under-reporting and 
under-diagnosing cases of Lyme disease.‖). 
 64. See id. at 714. 
 65. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the mainstream, evidence-based recommendations for Lyme 
treatment). 
 66. See ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S5. Because little evidence links pain and other 
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negative for Lyme disease infection by all objective measures, LLMDs 
nevertheless insist that the standard diagnostic tests are not sensitive 
enough to detect chronic infections.
67
 Most significantly, advocates of 
non-standard Lyme practice believe that intensive, expensive antibiotic 
regimens are required
68
 to control what those advocates understand to be a 
persistent and potentially untreatable ―chronic Lyme disease.‖69 
Mainstream infectious disease experts have disputed what they see as 
an unfounded belief
70
 in ―chronic Lyme disease‖—often vehemently.71 
From the perspective of LLMDs and their patients, on the other hand, the 
recommendation for limited antibiotic use articulated by the mainstream 
Lyme disease CPG
72
 amounts to nothing short of medical rationing, 
cloaked in the guise of evidence and expertise.
73
 This disagreement 
becomes particularly political when advocates of LLMD practice assert 
that the mainstream professional elite has conspired against effective 
treatment for illegitimate reasons, including economic interests.
74
  
For purposes of this discussion, the disagreements between the 
mainstream guidelines and the competing recommendation from the major 
association of LLMDs
75
 may be simplified into two categories. First, the 
 
 
subjective symptoms to Lyme disease, and because these symptoms mirror those ascribed to other 
unexplained conditions, Lyme disease has been described as ―yet another in a long series of 
‗containers‘ for ill-defined suffering,‖ including fibromyalgia and multiple chemical sensitivity. 
Leonard H. Sigal & Afton L. Hassett, Contributions of Societal and Geographical Environments to 
―Chronic Lyme Disease‖: The Psychopathogenesis and Aporology of a New ―Medically Unexplained 
Symptoms‖ Syndrome, 110 ENV. HEALTH PERSP. 607, 608 (2002). Even the ILADS Guidelines 
acknowledge that ―[t]he clinical features of chronic Lyme disease can be indistinguishable from 
fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome.‖ ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at S7. 
 67. See Phillip J. Baker, The Pain of Chronic Lyme Disease: Moving the Discourse in a Different 
Direction, 26 FASEB J. 11 (2012) (noting that LLMDs typically resort to laboratories providing 
unvalidated tests which provide false-positive results of infection). See also CDC, Notice to Readers: 
Caution Regarding Testing for Lyme Disease, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 125 (Feb. 
11, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5405a6.htm (last accessed 
Jan. 22, 2012). 
 68. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 69. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 70. Recent medical literature frequently employs the language of ―belief‖ to explain the 
community of patients and non-standard physicians who support the diagnosis and treatment of 
―chronic‖ Lyme disease that is ―contrary to scientific evidence‖ and associated with ―misinformation,‖ 
particularly from internet sources. See, e.g., Stanek, infra note 79, at 9–10. 
 71. See generally Auwaerter et al., supra note 19. 
 72. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
 73. See John D. Kraemer & Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary, Science, Politics, and Values: 
The Politicization of Professional Practice Guidelines, 301 JAMA 665, 666 (2009) (describing the 
political conflict over the mainstream CPG on Lyme disease treatment). 
 74. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Connecticut antitrust investigation into the mainstream 
IDSA Guidelines). 
 75. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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mainstream guidelines explicitly recommend against long-term antibiotic 
therapy (longer than about thirty days), whereas LLMDs strongly advocate 
therapy that extends for several months. Second, the mainstream 
guidelines specifically recommend that any antibiotic treatment of Lyme 
disease be based on objective manifestations of Lyme disease,
76
 such as a 
positive result from an approved diagnostic test.
77
 On this second point, 
LLMDs and their treatment guidelines sharply disagree; those guidelines 
emphasize that the decision to pursue antibiotic therapy be primarily left to 
the judgment of the physician, even in the face of a negative test result.
78
  
1. Lyme Disease 
Lyme disease is the most common tick-borne infection in North 
America,
79
 and the fifth most-common ―notifiable‖ disease in the United 
States.
80
 North American Lyme disease is caused by the bacterium, 
Borrelia burgdorferi (hereinafter B. burgdorferi).
81
 In the United States, B. 
burgdorferi is prevalent in certain tick populations in New England, the 
mid-Atlantic, and the upper Midwest.
82
 In humans who become infected 
from a tickbite, B. burgdorferi often causes a distinctly shaped skin rash 
(termed erythema migrans) around the area of the bite.
83
 Other early 
symptoms of Lyme disease may include ―[f]atigue, chills, fever, headache, 
muscle and joint aches, and swollen lymph nodes.‖84 The most serious 
effects of Lyme disease result from infections left untreated. Sixty percent 
of untreated patients develop manifestations of late-stage Lyme disease, 
 
 
 76. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1120 (―[H]aving once had objective evidence of B. 
burgdorferi infection must be a condition sine qua non‖ of antibiotic treatment.). 
 77. Baker, supra note 67, at 11. 
 78. ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S5 (―Since there is currently no definitive test for 
Lyme disease, laboratory results should not be used to exclude an individual from treatment[.] Lyme 
disease is a clinical diagnosis and tests should be used to support rather than supersede the physician‘s 
judgment.‖). This position—one of antibiotic maximalism—is discussed in greater detail, infra, in Part 
II.B.3.  
 79. Gerold Stanek et al., Lyme borreliosis, LANCET (published online Sept. 7, 2011) at 1. 
 80. CDC, SUMMARY OF NOTIFIABLE DISEASES—UNITED STATES, 2009 (Published May 17, 
2011 for 2009 / Vol. 58 / No. 53), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5853.pdf. As 
defined by the CDC, ―A notifiable disease is one for which regular, frequent, and timely information 
regarding individual cases is considered necessary for the prevention and control of the disease.‖ Id. 
Of several dozen notifiable infectious diseases in 2009, Lyme was behind only Chlamydia, Gonorrhea, 
Salmonella, and Syphilis (in order from most to least prevalent). Id. at 21 tbl.2. 
 81. Stanek, supra note 79, at 1. 
 82. SUMMARY OF NOTIFIABLE DISEASES—UNITED STATES, supra note 80, at 66. 
 83. CDC, SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF LYME DISEASE, http://www.cdc.gov/lyme/signs_symptoms/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). The characteristic rash is termed erythema migrans. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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such as severe arthritis, including painful joint swelling.
85
 In rare cases, 
infected patients may develop distinct, measurable neurological symptoms 
(e.g. meningitis or facial palsy) or cardiac problems (e.g. disturbances in 
heartbeat rhythm).
86
 However, even these later-stage symptoms of Lyme 
disease are usually resolved by a regimen of antibiotic treatment lasting 
from two to four weeks.
87
 
The mainstream medical literature recognizes that a minority of 
patients (perhaps around fifteen percent) experience long-term, persistent, 
and subjective symptoms, such as fatigue, and memory problems.
88
 These 
residual effects in treated individuals are classified as ―post-infection‖ or 
―post-treatment‖ syndrome.89 Physicians and researchers are currently 
seeking explanations and therapies for these symptoms; however, a 
substantial body of evidence indicates that post-infection symptoms 
should not be treated with antibiotics.
90
 
The terminology of Lyme disease can be confusing. In contrast to 
―post-infection‖ syndrome, ―chronic‖ Lyme disease is a diagnosis that 
many practitioners in the mainstream infectious disease community reject 
because it is often applied to patients who have subjective symptoms (e.g. 
pain, fatigue, and cognitive problems), but who do not exhibit measurable, 
clinical manifestations of infection.
91
 According to a recent, mainstream 
medical review: ―[M]ost patients receiving treatment for chronic Lyme 
disease have no convincing evidence, by history (sometimes including 
even absence of tick exposure), physical examination, or laboratory test 
results, of ever having had B burgdorferi . . . infection.‖92  
 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Stanek, supra note 79, at 3–4. 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. Id. at 8–9. 
 89. CDC, POST-TREATMENT LYME DISEASE SYNDROME, http://www.cdc.gov/lyme/postLDS/ 
index.html (last visited May 26, 2012) (―Approximately 10 to 20% of patients treated for Lyme 
disease with a recommended 2-4 week course of antibiotics will have lingering symptoms of fatigue, 
pain, or joint and muscle aches. In some cases, these can last for more than 6 months. Although often 
called "chronic Lyme disease," this condition is properly known as "Post-treatment Lyme disease 
Syndrome" (PTLDS).‖). 
 90. See Stanek, supra note 79, at 9. Antibiotic retreatment is contraindicated in patients 
experiencing ―post-infection‖/―post-treatment‖ syndrome because of the substantial risks of such 
treatment, including the negative side effects of antibiotics (which include antibiotic resistance), or the 
risk of infection caused by the catheters typically used to administer the drugs intravenously. See id. 
 91. Id. ―Chronic‖ Lyme disease is sometimes referred to as ―persistent.‖ See ILADS 
GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S4 (attributing symptoms that continue after thirty days of treatment as 
―persistent Lyme disease‖). 
 92. Stanek et al., supra note 79, at 9. 
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2. The Mainstream (IDSA) CPG on the Treatment of Lyme Disease 
The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), a physicians‘ 
association, publishes evidence-based CPGs for the treatment of numerous 
infections,
93
 including Lyme disease.
94
 For patients that meet distinct 
diagnostic criteria indicating Lyme infection,
95
 the IDSA Guidelines 
recommend antibiotic therapy lasting from ten to twenty-eight days, 
depending on the manifestation and state of progression of the disease.
96
 
The IDSA Guidelines also specify a variety of treatments that are not 
recommended ―[b]ecause of a lack of biologic plausibility, lack of 
efficacy, absence of supporting data, or the potential for harm to the 
patient.‖97 Among these contraindicated treatments is ―long-term antibiotic 
therapy,‖ as well as other unconventional treatment regimens and a 
number of specific drugs.
98
 Based on a number of evidence-based 
findings, the IDSA Guidelines assert that it is ―highly implausible‖ that 
Lyme infection can persist after the recommended, short-term antibiotic 
treatment regimen.
99
 
In addition to recommending against long-term antibiotic therapy for 
the treatment of Lyme disease generally, the IDSA Guidelines specifically 
reject the administration of such regimens in the context of ―chronic‖ 
Lyme disease. For one thing, the IDSA Guidelines remark that many 
patients initially diagnosed with ―chronic‖ Lyme disease fail to exhibit 
signs of actual infection with B. burgdorferi.
100
 Furthermore, IDSA‘s 
 
 
 93. Auwaerter et al., supra note 19, at 713. 
 94. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13. The IDSA Lyme-disease guidelines address 
epidemiology, diagnosis, and treatment in the clinical setting. Id. 
 95. The IDSA Guidelines stress the need for objective evidence of infection before a diagnosis is 
made. For instance, the Guidelines stipulate: ―In the absence of erythema migrans [i.e. the 
characteristic skin rash caused by B. burgdorferi infection], neurologic manifestations are too 
nonspecific to warrant a purely clinical diagnosis; laboratory support for the diagnosis is required.‖ Id. 
at 1107. 
 96. Id. at 1106 tbl.3. 
 97. Id. at 1105. 
 98. Id. The IDSA Guidelines warn against a number of non-recommended treatments. These 
include: ―Pulsed-dosing (i.e., antibiotic therapy on some days but not on other days),‖ ―[h]yperbaric 
oxygen therapy,‖ and ―[i]ntravenous hydrogen peroxide.‖ IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1107 
tbl.4. 
 99. Id. at 1118 (―The notion that symptomatic, chronic B. burgdorferi infection can exist despite 
recommended treatment courses of antibiotics . . . in the absence of objective clinical signs of disease, 
is highly implausible as evidenced by (1) the lack of antibiotic resistance in this genus, (2) the lack of 
correlation of persistent symptoms with laboratory evidence of inflammation or with the eventual 
development of objective physical signs, and (3) the lack of precedent for such a phenomenon in other 
spirochetal infections.‖) (citations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 1117 (―Unfortunately, it is apparent that the term ‗chronic Lyme disease‘ is also being 
applied to patients with vague, undiagnosed complaints who have never had Lyme disease. When 
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position is based on randomized controlled trials comparing the 
effectiveness of long-term antibiotic therapy with a placebo; such studies 
indicate that long-term antibiotic therapy does not help patients with 
putatively ―chronic‖ Lyme disease.101 Consequently, the IDSA Guidelines 
stake out a clear position on the existence and treatment of ―chronic‖ 
infections: 
To date, there is no convincing biologic evidence for the existence 
of symptomatic chronic B. burgdorferi infection among patients 
after receipt of recommended treatment regimens for Lyme disease. 
Antibiotic therapy has not proven to be useful and is not 
recommended for patients with chronic ( 6 months) subjective 
symptoms after administration of recommended treatment regimens 
for Lyme disease.
102
 
Internationally, mainstream infection-disease groups, including physician 
groups in the UK
103
 and Europe,
104
 have echoed IDSA‘s position on the 
use of long-term antibiotic regimens to treat Lyme disease. In addition, the 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warns against 
theories of persistent infection and treatments for supposed cases of 
―chronic‖ Lyme disease that ―are unproven or non-standard.‖105 
 
 
adult and pediatric patients regarded as having chronic Lyme disease have been carefully reevaluated 
at university-based medical centers, consistently, the majority of patients have had no convincing 
evidence of ever having had Lyme disease, on the basis of the absence of objective clinical, 
microbiologic, or serologic evidence of past or present B. burgdorferi infection.‖) (emphasis omitted) 
(citations omitted). 
 101. See, e.g., Mark S. Klempner et al., Two Controlled Trials Of Antibiotic Treatment In Patients 
With Persistent Symptoms And A History Of Lyme Disease, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 85, 85 (2001) 
(―There is considerable impairment of health-related quality of life among patients with persistent 
symptoms despite previous antibiotic treatment for acute Lyme disease. However, in these two trials, 
treatment with intravenous and oral antibiotics for 90 days did not improve symptoms more than 
placebo.‖). 
 102. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1120–21 (citations omitted). 
 103. British Infectious Ass‘n, The Epidemiology, Prevention, Investigation and Treatment of Lyme 
Borreliosis in United Kingdom Patients: A Position Statement by the British Infection Association, 62 
J. INFECTION 329, 336 (2011) (―There is evidence that some treatment strategies can be harmful. These 
include antimicrobial combinations, pulsed-dosing and long term antimicrobials. There are few data to 
support the use of other treatments and evidence that they may be harmful, sometimes seriously.‖). 
 104. G. Stanek et al., Lyme borreliosis: Clinical case definitions for diagnosis and management in 
Europe, 17 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY AND INFECTION 71, 74 (2011) (―PLS [persistent lyme disease] is 
sometimes equated with persistent [B. burdorferi] infection and referred to as ‗chronic‘ Lyme disease, 
but this is a misnomer and PLS does not warrant the use of expensive and potentially dangerous 
antibiotics. For such patients symptomatic treatment is recommended.‖) (citations omitted). 
 105. CDC, supra note 89 (―You [i.e., a suspected Lyme disease sufferer] may be tempted to try 
treatments that are unproven or non-standard in order to feel better. Unfortunately, many fraudulent 
products claiming to treat ―chronic Lyme disease‖ are available on the internet or through some 
providers. These products have not been shown to help and can be toxic and even deadly.‖) The CDC 
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That the IDSA Guidelines provide so much detail about the treatments 
that physicians are to avoid is a reflection of the heated debate between the 
evidence-based guidelines and a ―counterculture‖106 of physicians who 
insist that an untreatable and irreversible form of Lyme disease exists. 
LLMDs, represented by their own professional association, ILADS, 
portray mainstream doctors and researchers as having ignored long-term, 
―persistent‖ or ―chronic‖ cases of Lyme disease.107 ILADS claims that 
Lyme disease causes a host of subjective symptoms
108
 that persist or recur 
in spite of short-term (i.e., mainstream/IDSA) antibiotic treatment.
109
 
3. Antibiotic Maximalism: The Alternative (ILADS) Lyme Disease 
Guidelines 
Whereas the IDSA Guidelines caution against using antibiotic 
regimens that, according to the prevailing scientific consensus, are not 
plausibly effective against Lyme disease, a competing set of 
recommendations, published by the leading group of non-standard Lyme 
practitioners, ILADS, takes a very different approach. The current ILADS 
 
 
also cites ―long-term antibiotic treatment‖ as a dangerous therapeutic decision. Id. (―Regardless of the 
cause of PTLDS, studies have not shown that patients who received prolonged courses of antibiotics 
do better in the long run than patients treated with placebo. Furthermore, long-term antibiotic 
treatment for Lyme disease has been associated with serious complications. The good news is that 
patients with PTLDS almost always get better with time; the bad news is that it can take months to feel 
completely well.‖) (citation omitted). 
 106. Sigal & Hassett, supra note 66, at 608. 
 107. ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S4 (―Lyme disease was initially investigated by CDC 
epidemiologists focusing on erythema migrans, heart block, meningitis and arthritis. The ELISA test 
and later, the western blot, were introduced for seroepidemiologic studies. Chronic, persistent, 
recurrent and refractory Lyme disease were not included in these studies; consequently cases of 
chronic Lyme disease still go unrecognized.‖). 
 108. Id. (―For the purpose of the ILADS guidelines, ‗chronic Lyme disease‘ is inclusive of 
persistent symptomatologies including fatigue, cognitive dysfunction, headaches, sleep disturbance 
and other neurologic features, such as demyelinating disease, peripheral neuropathy and sometimes 
motor neuron disease; neuropsychiatric presentations; cardiac presentations including electrical 
conduction delays and dilated cardiomyopathy; and musculoskeletal problems.‖). The ILADS 
Guidelines further provide an extensive list of symptoms that underscores the diffuse, often subjective 
maladies that LLMDs ascribe to Lyme disease:  
Fatigue; Low grade fevers, ‗hot flashes‘ or chills; Night sweats; Sore throat; Swollen glands; 
Stiff neck; Migrating arthralgias, stiffness and, less commonly, frank arthritis; Myalgia; Chest 
pain and palpitations; Abdominal pain, nausea; Diarrhea; Sleep disturbance; Poor 
concentration and memory loss; Irritability and mood swings; Depression; Back pain; Blurred 
vision and eye pain; Jaw pain; Testicular/pelvic pain; Tinnitus; Vertigo; Cranial nerve 
disturbance (facial numbness, pain, tingling, palsy or optic neuritis); Headaches; 
‗Lightheadedness‘; Dizziness.  
Id. at S5. 
 109. Id. 
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CPG departs substantially from the mainstream IDSA CPG in substance 
and in spirit.
110
 For instance, the mainstream IDSA Guidelines provide 
detailed analysis of various treatment options before providing distinct 
recommendations. In contrast, the ILADS Guidelines offer deliberately 
vague recommendations that defer to the clinical judgment and autonomy 
of the treating physician.
111
 The ILADS CPG stresses the importance of 
clinical flexibility, judgment, and the ―community-based‖ physician, and 
has little regard for guidelines developed in the ―academic research 
setting[].‖112 
The ILADS Guidelines deploy clinical terminology to legitimize highly 
permissive recommendations on antibiotic therapy. For instance, the 
ILADS Guidelines endorse the ―empiric‖ treatment of Lyme disease.113 
Generally, ―empiric‖ therapy refers to the use of antibiotics based on the 
suspicion of bacterial infection, before the presence of infection is 
confirmed or the infective agent is identified.
114
 Empiric treatment is 
necessary in some clinical circumstances. For instance, an acute, life-
threatening infection may require the physician to make a treatment 
decision quickly, before definitive identification of the infection.
115
 
However, the empiric prescription of antibiotics has been blamed for the 
overuse of antibiotics and the resulting proliferation of dangerous resistant 
pathogens.
116
 
 
 
 110. The length of each CPG and its treatment of supporting material provide a rough indication 
of this contrast. Whereas the mainstream guidelines run to 47 pages, citing 405 papers and studies, 
IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, the ILADS Guidelines are 13 pages long, with 63 references, 
ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14. 
 111. See infra notes 112, 123 and accompanying text. 
 112. ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S11 (―Community-based clinicians and academic 
centers often have different criteria for diagnosis and divergent goals of care. The guidelines and 
standards of practice used for diagnosis of Lyme disease in academic research settings may not be 
applicable or appropriate for community-based settings. Moreover, the clinical manifestations of Lyme 
disease are often subtle or atypical in the community.‖) (citations omitted). 
 113. Id. at S9. 
 114. Jeffrey A. Claridge et al., Critical Analysis of Empiric Antibiotic Utilization: Establishing 
Benchmarks, 11 SURGICAL INFECTIONS 125, 126 (2010). 
 115. Community-acquired pneumonia is an example of an illness where empiric initiation of 
antibiotic therapy is indicated ―[i]n light of the better outcomes with the earliest possible 
interventions.‖ Jack M. Bernstein, Treatment of Community-Acquired Pneumonia—IDSA Guidelines, 
115 CHEST 9S, 9S (1999). Even in the case of pneumonia, however, the decision to institute various 
empiric therapies should be based only on precise clinical factors. See generally Lionell A. Mandell et 
al., Infectious Diseases Society of America/American Thoracic Society Consensus Guidelines on the 
Management of Community-Acquired Pneumonia in Adults, 44 Clinical Infectious Diseases S27 
(2007) (providing comprehensive guidelines on the selection of antibiotics, including by empiric 
methods, for community-acquired pneumonia). 
 116. A recent Institute of Medicine report opines that the availability of a diverse array of 
relatively safe antibiotics ―created a culture of empiricism that promoted antibiotic use, which in turn 
selected for resistance in targeted and nontargeted microbes . . . with consequences that are only now 
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Clinical emergencies that warrant empiric antibiotic therapy contrast 
with the chronic, diffuse, and non-fatal symptomology of Lyme disease 
described by the ILADS Guidelines. Indeed, by encouraging empiric 
antibiotic therapy based on highly subjective and remarkably broad 
clinical findings, the ILADS Guidelines adopt a profoundly maximalist 
position on antibiotic use. In spite of the existence of reliable tests for the 
presence of the Lyme disease bacterium, ILADS explicitly promotes the 
empiric treatment of patients suspected of having Lyme disease
117
 but who 
do not test positive for infection by an objective measure.
118
 Further, the 
ILADS CPG states that ―[t]he duration of therapy should be guided by 
clinical response, rather than by an arbitrary (i.e., 30 day) treatment 
course.‖119 Regarding non-standard, unproven treatment regimens, the 
ILADS Guidelines are open-minded, if not overtly optimistic.
120
 Perhaps 
the most maximalist aspect of the ILADS approach toward antibiotic use 
is expressed in a section entitled ―Decision to stop antibiotics,‖ which 
states that ―the optimal time to discontinue antibiotics is unknown‖ and 
that ―[p]atients must therefore be carefully evaluated for persistent 
infection before a decision is made to withhold therapy.‖121 The ILADS 
Guidelines mention only general concerns about antibiotic overuse.
122
 
 
 
beginning to be understood.‖ INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
GLOBAL HEALTH AND NOVEL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 80 (2010). Though 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) acknowledges that empiric use is sometimes necessary, 
Labeling Requirements for Systemtic Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for Human Use, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 6069 (Feb. 6, 2003) (―FDA recognizes that in many situations physicians must make difficult 
choices about the need for empiric therapy and broad-spectrum agent use‖), the agency promulgated 
new labeling language in 2004 that warns: ―Prescribing [the antibacterial drug product] in the absence 
of a proven or strongly suspected bacterial infection or a prophylactic indication is unlikely to provide 
benefit to the patient and increases the risk of the development of drug-resistant bacteria.‖ 21 C.F.R. 
§ 201.24 (2011). 
 117. ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S9 (ILADS ―recommends that empiric treatment be 
considered routine for patients with a likely diagnosis of Lyme disease.‖). 
 118. See id. at S8 (―Antibiotic therapy may need to be initiated upon suspicion of the diagnosis, 
even without definitive proof.‖). Under the heading ―Seronegative Lyme Disease‖ (―seronegative‖ 
refers to a negative result from a test of infection), the ILADS Guidelines may be read as supporting a 
presumption of Lyme disease in individuals who do not test positive for infection. Id. at S7 (―A patient 
who has tested seronegative may have a clinical presentation consistent with Lyme disease, especially 
if there is no evidence to indicate another illness.‖). See also supra note 78, and accompanying text. 
 119. ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S5 (―Symptoms may continue despite 30 days of 
treatment (persistent Lyme disease). The patient may relapse in the absence of another tickbite or 
erythema migrans rash (recurrent Lyme disease), or be poorly responsive to antibiotic treatment 
(refractory Lyme disease).‖). Id. at S4. 
 120. See, e.g., id. at S8 (―There is a paucity of data on alternative intravenous antibiotics, and their 
success is less predictable in chronic Lyme disease.‖). 
 121. Id. at S10. 
 122. Id. at S9 (―The importance of establishing the diagnosis of Lyme disease is heightened in 
light of increasing concern about antibiotic overuse.‖).  
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The conflict between the non-standard ILADS guidelines and the 
mainstream IDSA guidelines demonstrates the wide separation between 
the clinical philosophies of the two camps, particularly toward antibiotic 
use. Though CPGs can have the effect of challenging the clinical 
autonomy of physicians,
123
 the ILADS Guidelines may be read as an 
endorsement of the clinical autonomy of the LLMD.
124
 These differences 
have spawned political and legal battles, described in Part II, that provide 
context to the recent flurry of legislative activity surrounding Lyme 
disease, detailed in Part III. 
II. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF LLMD-PROTECTION 
STATUTES 
The most ambitious legal goal of LLMDs and their advocates is the 
enactment of statutory protections for physicians who diagnose and treat 
Lyme disease in contradiction to the mainstream clinical guidelines. 
Before analyzing examples of such laws (referred to here as ―LLMD-
protection‖ statutes) that are already in effect in several states, this Part 
describes the legal-political landscape that set the stage for these 
unprecedented legislative incursions into the oversight of physicians by 
medical licensing boards. Two phenomena, in particular, provide 
important context to the enactment of LLMD-protection statutes: 
(1) perceptions that authors of the mainstream IDSA CPG had conflicting 
economic and professional interests, thereby biasing those guidelines and 
(2) concerns among LLMDs and their advocates that state medical boards 
would discipline physicians who prescribed antibiotic regimens 
recommended against in the IDSA guidelines. 
A. Reactions to Perceived Conflicts-of-Interest Among IDSA Members 
A significant segment of patient advocates believes that the mainstream 
IDSA CPG blocks necessary treatment by rejecting certain controversial 
diagnoses and long-term antibiotic regimens. This movement perceives 
that an academic-industrial complex of infectious disease experts, 
pharmaceutical companies, and medical insurers has conspired to ration 
expensive therapies.
125
 In response to this grass-roots movement, 
 
 
 123. TIMMERMANS & BERG, supra note 33, at 103–05 (describing the impact on clinical 
autonomy brought about by the use of CPGs in managed-care settings, including Medicare and 
Medicaid, to enforce ―whether, how, and how long a patient can be treated‖). 
 124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 125. Such perceptions date at least to the early 1990s. See, e.g., Lyme Disease: A Diagnostic and 
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politicians have taken legislative and legal action against IDSA and its 
guidelines.  
Apart from the enactment of LLMD-protection statutes, the most 
notable government response to the LLMD movement was the 2006 
Connecticut antitrust investigation into IDSA and its Lyme disease 
practice guidelines.
126
 Following the release of revised IDSA Guidelines in 
2006,
127
 the Connecticut attorney general
128
 announced the investigation, 
alleging that IDSA violated state antitrust laws by excluding alternative, 
conflicting medical perspectives.
129
 The attorney general criticized the 
IDSA Guidelines as being ―voluntary‖ in name only, citing the fact that 
major insurers ―have used the guidelines as justification to deny 
reimbursement for long-term antibiotic treatment.‖130 No court action was 
taken, but the IDSA agreed to a settlement in 2008, stipulating an open 
review of the IDSA Guidelines by an independent board of experts.
131
 
That review was completed in 2010, when the independent review panel 
affirmed the IDSA Guidelines and concluded that they ―were medically 
 
 
Treatment Dilemma: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. 54–
59 (1993) (Testimony and prepared statement of Joseph Burrascano, a leading LLMD) (declaring that 
―[t]here is a core group of university based Lyme disease researchers and physicians whose opinions 
carry a great deal of weight‖ and noting that ―Lyme patients are being denied [long-term antibiotic] 
therapy for political reasons and/or because insurance companies refuse to pay for these longer 
treatments.‖). 
 126. This episode has received some attention in the legal literature, though the prior coverage has 
embraced the LLMD position on the existence of ―chronic‖ Lyme disease and, generally, the LLMD 
therapeutic paradigm. See Tammy Asher, Unprecedented Antitrust Investigation into the Lyme Disease 
Treatment Guidelines Development Process, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 117, 141–42 (2011) (broadly endorsing 
the LLMD position on Lyme disease treatment and suggesting that the IDSA Guidelines prevent 
patients from receiving ―proven treatment options‖); Johanna Ferguson, Note, Cure Unwanted? 
Exploring the Chronic Lyme Disease Controversy and Why Conflicts of Interest in Practice Guidelines 
May Be Guiding Us Down the Wrong Path, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 196 (2012) (suggesting that, because 
of the existence of the IDSA Guidelines, ―many [chronic] Lyme patients today continue to find 
themselves suffering without access to treatment‖). 
 127. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
 128. The Connecticut attorney general, Richard Blumenthal, was elected to the U.S. Senate from 
Connecticut in 2010, where he has co-sponsored legislation related to Lyme disease and antibiotics. 
See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Blumenthal, Reed, Gillibrand, Whitehouse 
Introduce Legislation to Combat Lyme Disease (July 18, 2011), available at http://blumenthal.senate 
.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-reed-gillibrand-whitehouse-introduce-legislation-to-combat-
lyme-disease. 
 129. Susan Warner, State Official Subpoenas Infectious Disease Group, SCIENTIST, Feb. 7, 2007, 
http://classic.the-scientist.com/news/display/49605/; Kraemer & Gostin, supra note 73. 
 130. Press Release, Conn. Att‘y Gen.‘s Office, Attorney General’s Investigation Reveals Flawed 
Lyme Disease Guideline Process, IDSA Agrees To Reassess Guidelines, Install Independent Arbiter 
(May 1, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=414284. 
 131. An Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut and the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America (Apr. 30, 2008) at 1–2, available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/health/ 
idsaagreement.pdf. 
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and scientifically justified on the basis of all of the available evidence and 
that no changes to the guidelines were necessary.‖132  
The implications of antitrust law on the IDSA guidelines and the 
development and use of CPGs, generally, are outside the scope of this 
Note.
133
 Although the scientific justification for the IDSA guidelines was 
affirmed, LLMDs and their advocates continue to attract politicians to 
their cause of repudiating the mainstream Lyme disease CPG. For 
instance, in January 2012, three members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives called for the removal of the IDSA Guidelines from a 
federal CPG database, the National Guideline Clearinghouse.
134
 The 
Representatives referred to the IDSA Guidelines as ―highly controversial,‖ 
blaming them for ―insurance company denials of Lyme disease 
treatments.‖135  
 
 
 132. Paul M. Lantos et al., Final Report of the Lyme Disease Review Panel of the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America, 51 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1, 1 (2010). Predictably, the 
independent review report did not appease chronic Lyme advocates. Patricia Callahan & Trine 
Tsouderos, Chronic Lyme Disease: A Dubious Diagnosis, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2010, at 1 (calling the 
review a ―call to arms for chronic Lyme advocates‖). The response of two ILADS members 
demonstrates their fundamental disagreement with clinical practice guidelines:  
The role of a medical society is not to ‗call the science‘ according to the vote of a panel that 
represents one side of a debate. Every guidelines panel should acknowledge diversity of 
opinion, defer to clinical judgment, and respect patient autonomy. Failure to do so may 
produce a short-term benefit in terms of upholding the status quo and protecting the society 
from litigation, but the ultimate cost may be severe damage to patient care and the society‘s 
reputation as an impartial authority on good medicine. 
Lorraine Johnson & Raphael B. Stricker, Correspondence, Final Report of the Lyme Disease Review 
Panel of the Infectious Diseases Society of America: A Pyrrhic Victory?, 51 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1108, 1109 (2010). 
 133. However, some previous coverage of the putative legality of the IDSA guidelines has been 
misleading. See Asher, supra note 126, at 144 (suggesting that IDSA had violated § 2 of the Sherman 
Act by ―unlawfully monopoliz[ing] the treatment of Lyme disease‖). Of relevance to the current 
discussion of state medical regulation, Asher suggests that IDSA unlawfully monopolized Lyme 
disease treatment ―by allowing medical boards to investigate and sanction doctors who do not follow 
the IDSA Guidelines.‖ Id. Asher‘s argument that the IDSA guidelines are ―effectively mandatory,‖ id. 
at 136, apparently ignores the distinction between the private CPG authors and state medical 
regulators. Activity by the latter would not necessarily fall within reach of the Sherman Act, due to the 
of the well-established ―state action‖ exception to that law. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–
51 (1942); E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHOWARD A. SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST 
LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE, 1024–25 (6th ed. 2009). 
 134. Press Release, Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA), Outdated Guidelines for Treating Lyme 
Disease Should be Removed from Government Web Site Used by Doctors as Resource for Medical 
Protocols (Jan. 20 2012), available at http://wolf.house.gov/index.cfm?sectionid=34&sectiontree= 
6,34&itemid=1861. 
 135. Id. 
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B. Discipline of Alternative Lyme Practitioners by State Licensing Boards 
In addition to allegations of collusion between mainstream Lyme 
experts and corporate healthcare, including health insurers, a central 
concern among LLMDs and their advocates is that controversial practices 
by LLMDs could lead to sanctions by state medical regulators. Indeed, 
LLMD-protection statutes primarily respond to a perception among 
LLMDs and their advocates that LLMDs are subject to enhanced scrutiny 
by state medical licensing boards when they administer long-term 
antibiotic therapy.
136
 In line with their perception of CPG authors, LLMDs 
and their advocates view state medical boards as bastions of ―organized 
medicine‖ that are professionally and politically biased against 
―independent‖ physicians (i.e., those that prescribe non-standard 
treatments).
137
  
Disciplinary actions by state medical boards against LLMDs are not 
unprecedented. On the fringes, some such cases involve egregious medical 
misconduct that is not limited to the improper diagnosis or treatment of 
Lyme disease.
138
 However, other board actions have been directed at 
leading LLMDs who are well respected among advocates of the ―chronic‖ 
Lyme disease paradigm. For instance, in a high-profile case in 2006, the 
North Carolina Medical Board disciplined Dr. Joseph Jemsek, a licensed 
 
 
 136. See Open Letter from Daniel Cameron, President, ILADS, to the Connecticut Legislature 
(Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ilads.org/ilads_news/2009/call-to-protect-a-physicians-
freedom-to-practice-medicine (―Physicians have been reluctant to treat LD patients based on reports 
that physicians who treat LD have been subject to professional misconduct proceedings.‖); Press 
Release, Connecticut Department of Public Health, Governor Rell: New Law Protects Doctors in 
Treatment of Lyme Disease (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/dph/cwp/view 
.asp?A=3659&Q=443628 (noting that prior to the enactment of the protective statutes ―[s]ome 
physicians were hesitant to treat patients outside the IDSA guidelines because of potential reprimands 
from medical boards and insurance companies.‖). 
 137. See Andrew L. Schlafly, Medical Board Stripped of Power, 16 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & 
SURGEONS 77, 79 (2011) (―In many states there is a revolving door between the state medical 
societies, state medical boards, and the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), with the result 
that many leaders of state medical societies view the medical boards as their allies rather than as their 
adversaries. Sadly, most state medical societies no longer truly represent independent physicians, and 
many look to other sources for additional funding.‖). Andrew Schlafly is the general counsel of AAPS. 
Id. at 80. 
 138. Order of Temporary Suspension, James Michael Shortt, M.D., S.C. Bd. of Med. Exam‘r 
(Apr. 13, 2005) (suspending the license of one physician, James Shortt, for multiple reasons: not only 
did Shortt diagnose Lyme disease based on results from an unaccredited laboratory, he also prescribed 
anabolic steroids without sufficient justification and ―regularly infused patients with intravenous 
hydrogen peroxide‖); Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order on Remand, In re 
Stephen L. Smith, State of Washington Dept. of Health, 05-01-A-1038MD (July 31, 2007) (holding 
that the physician violated a professional conduct statute when the physician had a central line 
installed in a patient for ―possible Lyme disease treatment‖ and dehydration). 
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physician and well-known LLMD, for ―unprofessional conduct‖ because 
he administered long-term antibiotic therapy to patients he had diagnosed 
with Lyme disease.
139
 The board found that Jemsek prescribed long-term 
regimens of oral or intravenous antibiotics ―even though there [was] an 
absence of any research or clinical evidence of efficacy for such 
treatments.‖140 Not only did several of Jemsek‘s patients experience 
negative side effects related to the intravenous administration of 
antibiotics,
141
 the Board also determined that Jemsek‘s administration of 
unproven treatments amounted to experimentation on patients without 
their informed consent.
142
 The Board found these practices to be 
―unprofessional conduct‖ within the meaning of the North Carolina 
statute.
143
 
Jemsek is just one of a number of cases in which non-standard Lyme 
practices have drawn medical board scrutiny.
144
 Medical boards have 
sometimes sided with LLMDs, or at least have sometimes adopted a more 
permissive attitude toward non-standard Lyme practice.
145
 For instance, in 
 
 
 139. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, & Order of Discipline, In re Jemsek, N.C. Med. Bd. 
(Aug. 21, 2006) [hereinafter In re Jemsek], available at http://wwwapps.ncmedboard.org/Clients/ 
NCBOM/Public/Licensee InformationSearch.aspx (enter ―23386‖ in ―License of Approval Number‖ 
search field). 
 140. Id. at 2. The Board found that  
Dr. Jemsek administered a treatment that departed from acceptable and prevailing standards 
of practice, including prescribing a course of oral and/or intravenous antibiotics to be 
administered to the patients for several months, or in some cases, years, even though there is 
an absence of any research or clinical evidence of efficacy for such treatments. In regard to 
the administration of intravenous antibiotics, Dr. Jemsek inserted indwelling venous access, 
for which there exists an increased risk of infection. Patients did, in fact, suffer infections 
from their indwelling catheters, some infections becoming life-threatening. 
Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 4 (―By not properly explaining his methods of diagnosing and treating Lyme 
disease to Patients A through J, Dr. Jemsek breached his patients‘ informed consent, and therefore 
engaged in unprofessional conduct, including, but not limited to, departure from, or the failure to 
conform to, the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice, or the ethics of the medical 
profession, irrespective of whether a patient is injured thereby, within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 90-14(a)(6), and grounds exist under that section of the North Carolina General Statutes for the 
Board to annul, suspend, revoke, or limit his license to practice medicine and surgery issued by the 
Board or deny any application he might make in the future.‖). 
 143. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6)). In spite of scrutiny by the North Carolina State 
Medical Board, Jemsek remained a prominent LLMD, with an office in Washington, D.C. and a 
position on the board of ILADS. Callahan & Tsouderos, supra note 132.  
 144. LLMD advocates claimed that at least 50 such cases had been brought prior to 2000. 
Holcomb B. Noble, Lyme Doctors Rally Behind A Colleague Under Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/10/us/lyme-doctors-rally-behind-a-colleague-
under-inquiry.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 145. In re Raxlen, a Connecticut disciplinary case, provides one example of deference by a state 
medical board toward LLMDs. Memorandum of Decision, Conn. Med. Examining Bd., Petition No. 
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2001, the New York State Board for Professional Conduct explicitly 
avoided taking a position on Lyme disease treatment in an action against 
another high-profile LLMD, Dr. Joseph Burrascano.
146
 At the time, 
―thousands of patients‖147 had seen Burruscano for treatment of Lyme and 
suspected ―co-infective‖ agents.148 In its findings, the Board cited then-
current IDSA recommendations on Lyme treatment as ―the standard 
treatment for Lyme disease.‖149 The Board acknowledged that the IDSA 
recommendations conflicted with the longer regimens Burrascano had 
prescribed to his patients.
150
 Though Burrascano was condemned on other 
counts,
151
 the New York board refrained from sanctioning Burrascano for 
prescribing long-term antibiotic therapy, citing the ―highly polarized and 
politicized‖ nature of the Lyme disease treatment debate.152 
 
 
980108-001-001 (2002), available at http://www.dir.ct.gov/dph/hcquality/Physician/Orders_ 
Physicians/001-016443/19980108001001.pdf (last accessed Jan. 5, 2012) (holding that a physician 
who prescribed long-term antibiotic therapy, in spite of inconclusive laboratory testing for Lyme 
disease, did not ―[fall] below the standard of care‖ because of the ―developing‖ standards for Lyme 
disease care). 
 146. Determination and Order, In re Burrascano, No. 01-265, Adin. Review Bd. for Prof‘l Med. 
Conduct, State of N.Y. (Apr. 18, 2001) [hereinafter ―In re Burrascano‖]. Burrascano is a member of 
the working group that devised the ILADS Guidelines, supra note 14, as well as the author of a Lyme 
treatment manual that promotes the use of high-dose ―pulsed‖ antibiotic therapy, among other 
strategies. See JOSEPH BURRASCANO, DIAGNOSTIC HINTS AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES FOR LYME 
AND OTHER TICK BORNE ILLNESSES 23 (15th ed., 2005), available at http://www.ilads.org/ 
files/burrascano_0905.pdf. The Board‘s inquiry into Burrascano attracted substantial protest from 
some of his patients, supporters, and other LLMDs. Noble, supra note 144. 
 147. Determination and Order, In re Burrascano, No. 01-265, State Bd. for Prof‘l Med. Conduct, 
State of N.Y. (Nov. 2 2001) at 4 [hereinafter ―Board Order for In re Burrascano‖]. 
 148. Co-infection occurs when a patient is infected with other tick-borne pathogens in addition to 
Borrelia burgdorferi. See Stanek et al., supra note 79, at 9 (―[Ticks] can be co-infected with and 
transmit Lyme borrelia along with other pathogens such as Anaplasma phagocytophilum, Babesia spp, 
and tick-borne encephalitis virus.‖). 
 149. Board Order for In re Burrascano, supra note 147, at 8, ¶ 19. 
 150. E.g., id. at 18 ¶ 61 (describing one patient who was treated by Burrascano with several 
months of antibiotics). 
 151. The Board found Burrascano‘s conduct negligent in two instances: (1) when he diagnosed 
ehrlichiosis in a patient without sufficient support and (2) for prescribing antibiotics to treat Lyme after 
the patient had experienced seizures, allegedly induced by one prescribed antibiotic, Bicillin. Id. at 24–
25, 31–32. 
 152. Id. at 41 (―The Hearing Committee recognizes the existence of the current debate within the 
medical community over issues concerning management of patients with recurrent or long term Lyme 
disease. This appears to be a highly polarized and politicized conflict, as was demonstrated to this 
Committee by expert testimony from both sides, each supported by numerous medical journal articles, 
and each emphatic that the opposite position was clearly incorrect. It fact [sic], it often appeared that 
the testimony was framed to espouse specific viewpoints, rather than directly answer questions posed. 
What clearly did emerge however, was that Respondent‘s approach, while certainly a minority 
viewpoint, is one that is shared by many other physicians. We recognize that the practice of medicine 
may not always be an exact science, ‗issued guidelines‘ are not regulatory, and patient care is 
frequently individualized. We are also acutely aware that it was not this Committee‘s role to resolve 
this medical debate . . . ‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
222 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:199 
 
 
 
 
The contrasting results in Burrascano and Jemsek demonstrate the 
differential weight that state medical boards may give to the IDSA Lyme 
disease practice guidelines. Timing may also have contributed to the 
contrast; Jemsek may represent a modern board taking a stronger stand 
against long-term antibiotic regimens. Regardless, with the intense 
publicity surrounding disciplinary cases involving leaders of the LLMD 
movement, such as Jemsek and Burrascano,
153
 it is unsurprising that the 
chronic Lyme disease movement directed its activities toward preventing 
such disciplinary actions in the first place. 
III. RECENT STATE LAWS PROTECTING LLMDS FROM PROFESSIONAL 
DISCIPLINE FOR NON-STANDARD LYME DISEASE PRACTICES 
In response to perceptions that LLMDs could be disciplined for 
prescribing long-term antibiotic therapy,
154
 several states have passed laws 
that specifically protect non-standard Lyme disease practitioners from 
discipline by state medical regulators. To date, such laws exist in 
California,
155
 Connecticut,
156
 Massachusetts,
157
 and Rhode Island.
158
 Of 
these, all but the California statute
159
 are explicitly directed at protecting 
the controversial use of long-term antibiotic therapy in contradiction with 
the mainstream IDSA guidelines.
160
 One striking aspect of these laws is 
 
 
 153. See Callahan & Tsouderos, supra note 132 (describing the North Carolina disciplinary 
actions against Jemsek); Noble, supra note 144 (describing protests held in support of Burrascano 
during his New York medical board hearing). 
 154. See supra note 136. 
 155. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234.1 (2011). The California LLMD-protection law originated 
out of a 2004 blanket provision, protecting physicians from discipline for providing ―alternative or 
complementary medicine,‖ subject to certain conditions, including that the treatment ―does not cause 
death or serious bodily injury to the patient.‖ 2004 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 742 (S.B. 1691) (West). In 
2005, the law was amended to include ―treatment of persistent Lyme disease,‖ specifically, among the 
protective alternative practices (no other disease is mentioned by name). 2005 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 
304 (A.B. 592) (West). The law cited the slow pace of traditional medicine as justification for 
protecting alternative practitioners:  
Since the National Institute of Medicine has reported that it can take up to 17 years for a new 
best practice to reach the average physician and surgeon, it is prudent to give attention to new 
developments not only in general medical care but in the actual treatment of specific diseases, 
particularly those that are not yet broadly recognized in California.  
Id. 
 156. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m (West 2011) (enacted 2009). 
 157. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12DD (2011) (enacted 2010). 
 158. R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956, § 5-37.5-4 (2011) (enacted 2002). 
 159. The California LLMD provision does not specifically describe protected treatments. CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234.1 (2011). 
 160. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m (West 2011) (entitled ―Administration of long-
term antibiotic therapy upon diagnosis of Lyme disease‖). 
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the unique oversight exception that they create for Lyme disease.
161
 
Legislation directed at alternative Lyme disease treatments is a recent 
and ongoing trend. Connecticut and Massachusetts passed statutes in 2009 
and 2010, respectively.
162
 Similar laws have been proposed recently in 
other states, including Virginia and Maryland.
163
 Minnesota legislators 
withdrew a 2010 LLMD-protection bill only after the state medical board 
announced a five-year moratorium on investigating or disciplining 
physicians for treating ―chronic Lyme disease‖ with long-term antibiotic 
therapy.
164
 Advocates view further LLMD-protection statutes as the 
vanguard of a broader campaign to enact measures that limit state 
regulation of medical practice.
165
 
LLMD-protection statutes create broad exceptions to the disciplinary 
authority of state medical regulators. First, the statutes provide an 
expansive definition of ―Lyme disease‖—one that includes diagnoses 
made in the absence of objective clinical manifestations of infection. 
Second, the statutes provide a broad description of the ―long-term 
antibiotic therapy‖166 exempt from medical board review.167 In addition, 
these LLMD-protection laws are bolstered in two states by separate 
legislation that anticipates insurance companies‘ use of the IDSA CPG to 
deny reimbursement for non-standard care by mandating, by statute, some 
insurance reiumbursements for those controversial therapies.
168
 
A. Statutory Definitions of Lyme Disease 
Current LLMD-protection laws limit their reach to the treatment of 
―Lyme disease.‖ Thus, the manner in which the disease is defined will 
necessarily determine which treatment decisions qualify for protection. In 
line with the loose diagnostic guidelines championed by the LLMD 
 
 
 161.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-8 et seq. (West 2011) (specifying no other disease 
contexts in which physicians are exempt from discipline).  
 162. See supra notes 156 and 157. 
 163. Gerald C. Canaan & Karah L. Gunther, Lyme Disease: The Surprising Debate in the 2010 
Virginia House of Delegates, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1 (2010). In Virginia, though Lyme disease 
had not previously entered the legislative consciousness, five bills were proposed in 2010. Id. at 1.  
 164. Callahan & Tsouderos, supra note 132. 
 165. See Schlafly, supra note 137, at 79 (―AAPS hopes [LLMD-protection statutes] will be passed 
in other states . . . . But medical board abuse extends far beyond treatment of Lyme disease. AAPS 
also backs a broad withdrawal of power from medical boards, in order to help patients and physicians 
in nearly all fields of medical practice.‖). 
 166. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12DD 
(2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.5-4 (West 2011).  
 167. See infra Parts III.A-III.C. 
 168. See infra Part III.D. 
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association, ILADS,
169
 the statutes generally place very few restrictions on 
the diagnosis of Lyme disease.  
Where LLMD-protection statutes explicitly define Lyme disease, that 
definition is broader than the disease definition provided by the 
mainstream (IDSA) diagnostic guidelines.
170
 The diagnostic requirements 
in the most recent LLMD-protection statutes, from Connecticut and 
Massachusetts, are nearly identical.
171
 Each provides ample leeway for the 
clinical judgment of the treating physician by describing several qualifying 
diagnoses:  
―Lyme disease‖ means the clinical diagnosis by a [licensed 
physician] of the presence in a patient of signs or symptoms 
compatible with [1] acute infection with borrelia burgdorferi; or [2] 
with late stage or persistent or chronic infection with borrelia 
burgdorferi, or [3] with complications related to such an infection; 
or [4] such other strains of borrelia that, on and after July 1, 2009, 
are recognized by the National Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention as a cause of Lyme disease.
172
 
Notably, the statute does not specifically define ―signs or symptoms 
compatible with‖ the various forms of Lyme disease it describes.173 
However, the ILADS Guidelines list over two dozen Lyme disease 
symptoms (not including such objective indicators as lab tests or the 
erythema migrans rash), ranging from abdominal pain and diarrhea to 
back pain, jaw pain, and ―poor concentration and memory loss.‖174 
Regardless of the qualifying symptoms, the diagnosis of ―chronic‖ and 
―persistent‖ infections is a mainstay of non-standard/LLMD Lyme 
 
 
 169. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 170. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13. 
 171. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12DD 
(2011). 
 172. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added). Massachusetts‘ 
definition is worded only slightly differently, providing that ―Lyme disease shall also include . . . a 
clinical diagnosis of Lyme disease that does not meet the National Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention surveillance criteria but presents other acute and chronic signs or symptoms of Lyme 
disease as determined by the treating physician.‖ MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12DD(a) (2011). 
 173. Medical ―signs‖ are distinct from medical ―symptoms‖; the former are based on the 
subjective description of the patient and the latter on observations of the physician. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1528 (providing information to applicants for federal disability benefits). ―Symptoms are [the 
patient‘s own] description of [his] physical or mental impairment.‖ Id. ―Signs are anatomical, 
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be observed, apart from [the patient‘s] 
statements (symptoms). Signs must be shown by medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques. 
. . . [Psychiatric signs] must . . . be shown by observable facts that can be medically described and 
evaluated.‖ Id. 
 174. See supra note 107; ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S4-S5. 
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practice
175
 even though these conditions are not recognized by the 
mainstream infectious-disease community.
176
  
Finally, the statutory reference to the CDC‘s Lyme diagnosis criteria is 
of questionable importance, because neither Massachusetts nor 
Connecticut actually requires objective evidence of infection. For instance, 
the Connecticut Lyme disease definition provides that Lyme disease 
includes both (1) an ―infection that meets the surveillance criteria set forth 
by the National Centers for Disease Control and Prevention‖177 and 
(2) ―other acute and chronic manifestations of such an infection as 
determined by a physician.‖178 It is not unnatural to construe that provision 
as rendering the CDC diagnostic criteria unnecessary. 
Further, by incorporating into the definition of ―Lyme disease‖ those 
diagnoses made in the absence of objective evidence of infection, the 
statutes endorse the empiric use of antibiotics championed by LLMDs.
179
 
Connecticut‘s statute recognizes not only diagnoses reached ―in 
conjunction with testing that provides supportive data‖ for diagnosis, but 
also a ―clinical diagnosis that is based on knowledge obtained through 
medical history and physical examination alone.‖180 The Massachusetts 
statute contains a nearly identical provision.
181
 By explicitly removing the 
requirement that infection be shown by laboratory testing, the Connecticut 
statute rejects IDSA recommendations, opting to endorse the maximalist, 
empiric use of antibiotics championed by the ILADS and leading 
LLMDs.
182
  
The Rhode Island and California statutes provide less detailed 
definitions of Lyme disease. Rhode Island requires only that a patient is 
―diagnosed with and ha[s] symptoms of Lyme disease‖ and that ―this 
diagnosis and treatment plan has been documented in the physician's 
 
 
 175. See ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S4–S5. 
 176. See Stanek et al., supra note 79, at 9. 
 177. ―Surveillance criteria‖ refers to the case definition used by the CDC in monitoring Lyme 
disease cases in the U.S. Lyme Disease 2011 Case Definition, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/osels/ 
ph_surveillance/nndss/casedef/lyme_disease_current.htm (last visited May 26, 2012) [hereinafter 
―CDC Surveillance Criteria‖]. The criteria divides cases into ―confirmed,‖ ―probable,‖ and 
―suspected‖ categories, all requiring positive laboratory tests or presentation of the characteristic 
erythema migrans rash. Id. 
 178. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 179. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m(a) (West 2011). 
 181. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112, § 12DD(a) (2011) (―diagnosis [of Lyme disease] shall be based 
on knowledge obtained through medical history and physical examination only or in conjunction with 
testing that provides supportive data for such clinical diagnosis‖). 
 182. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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medical record for that patient.‖183 California provides protection for 
treatment of ―persistent‖ Lyme disease,184 which is the term invoked by 
ILADS for cases that typically require long-term antibiotic therapy.
185
 
California‘s LLMD-protection provision is contained within a broader 
statute protecting alternative medical practices generally; the statute 
contains common requirements regarding diagnosis and information that 
must be provided to the patient.
186
 
B. Protected Long-Term Antibiotic Therapy 
California and Rhode Island do not describe a particular genre of Lyme 
disease treatment that should be exempt from discipline, but Connecticut 
and Massachusetts specifically provide protection for ―long-term antibiotic 
therapy.‖ The Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes provide almost 
identical
187
 definitions for this protected class of therapy: ―the 
administration of oral, intramuscular or intravenous antibiotics singly or in 
combination, for periods of time in excess of four weeks.‖188 This ―four 
week‖ time limit directly challenges the upper limit for antibiotic therapy 
 
 
 183. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.5-4 (West 2011). 
 184. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234.1 (West 2011). 
 185. See ILADS GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at S5 (―The practice of stopping antibiotics to allow 
for delayed recovery is not recommended for persistent Lyme disease. In these cases, it is reasonable 
to continue treatment for several months after clinical and laboratory abnormalities have begun to 
resolve and symptoms have disappeared.‖). For discussion, and one viewpoint, of the California 
LLMD-protection law, see Justin J. Simpson, Note, Chapter 304: Broadening The Scope of Alternative 
and Complementary Medicine to Include Treatment of Persistent Lyme Disease, 37 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 157, 163–64 (2006). 
 186. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234.1 (West 2011) The statute protects complementary and 
alternative medical treatment and advice that meets the following requirements:  
(1) It is provided after informed consent and a good-faith prior examination of the patient, and 
medical indication exists for the treatment or advice, or it is provided for health or well-being. 
(2) It is provided after the physician and surgeon has given the patient information concerning 
conventional treatment and describing the education, experience, and credentials of the 
physician and surgeon related to the alternative or complementary medicine that he or she 
practices. (3) In the case of alternative or complementary medicine, it does not cause a delay 
in, or discourage traditional diagnosis of, a condition of the patient. (4) It does not cause death 
or serious bodily injury to the patient. 
Id. The California statute applies a risk/benefit standard to its definition of protected therapies, 
defining ―alternative or complementary medicine,‖ as ―those health care methods of diagnosis, 
treatment, or healing that are not generally used but that provide a reasonable potential for therapeutic 
gain in a patient's medical condition that is not outweighed by the risk of the health care method.‖ Id. 
§ 2234.1(b). 
 187. The Massachusetts statute omits a comma after the word ―singly.‖ MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 
112, § 12DD (2011). 
 188. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12DD (2011). 
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of twenty-eight days provided in the IDSA Guidelines.
189
 Because the term 
―antibiotic‖ is undefined, a literal reading of the statute applies even to 
those antibiotics that IDSA has warned against using to treat Lyme disease 
―[b]ecause of a lack of biologic plausibility, lack of efficacy, absence of 
supporting data, or the potential for harm to the patient.‖190 
C. Specific Restrictions on the Disciplinary Discretion of State Medical 
Regulators 
Though their disease and treatment definitions differ in specificity, 
LLMD-protection statutes share a goal: to restrict state licensing boards 
from disciplining physicians for administering long-term antibiotic therapy 
for Lyme disease. The Connecticut provision serves as a useful example. 
To grant physicians leeway to employ the controversial antibiotic 
regimens, the statute limits the power of the state‘s Medical Examining 
Board
191
 to investigate or discipline
192
 physicians for prescribing long-term 
antibiotic therapy in the context of the statute‘s broad definition of Lyme 
disease.
193
 The statute explicitly shields physicians from board 
investigations or discipline related to the antibiotic therapy.
194
 
D. Statutes Mandating Insurance Coverage for Non-Standard Lyme 
Disease Therapy 
Discipline-preemption statutes are bolstered by state laws that mandate 
insurance coverage of long-term antibiotic therapy. The high cost of long-
 
 
 189. See IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1106 tbl.3. 
 190. IDSA GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 1094 (listing, among other therapies, a number of 
antibiotic drugs not recommended to treat Lyme disease: ―vancomycin, metronidazole, tinidazole-
amantadine, ketolides, isoniazid, trimethoprim, sulfamethoxazole, fluconazole, [and] benzathine 
penicillin G‖). 
 191. The Connecticut Medical Examining Board is described in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-8a 
(West 2011). 
 192. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-13c (West 2011) authorizes the Connecticut Medical 
Examining Board to ―restrict, suspend or revoke the license or limit the right to practice of a 
physician‖ for several enumerated reasons, including ―illegal, incompetent or negligent conduct in the 
practice of medicine.‖ 
 193. See supra Part III.B. 
 194. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-14m (West 2011) (―[T]he Department of Public Health shall 
not initiate a disciplinary action against a licensed physician and such physician shall not be subject to 
disciplinary action by the Connecticut Medical Examining Board solely for prescribing, administering 
or dispensing long-term antibiotic therapy to a patient clinically diagnosed with Lyme disease, 
provided such clinical diagnosis and treatment has been documented in the patient's medical record by 
such licensed physician.‖). 
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term intravenous (IV) antibiotic treatment
195
 can create a significant 
barrier to patients wishing to pursue treatment. Health insurers may 
reimburse for the cost of standard antibiotics in oral form, but they 
typically do not reimburse for the more expensive IV therapy prescribed to 
patients with ―chronic Lyme disease‖ or other non-standard Lyme 
diagnoses.
196
 As a result, patients may forgo long-term antibiotic treatment 
even when they find an LLMD to provide the prescription.
197
 (Indeed, the 
mainstream IDSA Guidelines were originally cited by insurance 
companies who denied coverage for the controversial intensive antibiotic 
regimens.)
198
 An important goal of those who seek to legitimize long-term 
antibiotic therapy has been recognition of and payment for such treatment 
by health insurers.
199
 
At present, Connecticut and Rhode Island, two states with LLMD-
protection laws, also mandate insurance coverage for Lyme disease. 
Connecticut adopted such a mandate several years before it passed the 
LLMD-protection law; it does not specifically address long-term antibiotic 
therapy, though it states that insurance ―shall provide further treatment‖ 
beyond standard, short-term regimens, ―if recommended by a [licensed,] 
board certified rheumatologist, infectious disease specialist or 
 
 
 195. One analysis indicates that the cost of a multi-week course of intravenous antibiotics can 
reach into the thousands of dollars, not including the cost of administration. Mark H. Eckman et al., 
Cost Effectiveness of Oral as Compared with Intravenous Antibiotic Therapy for Patients with Early 
Lyme Disease or Lyme Arthritis, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 357, 360 tbl.3 (1997). Patients and their 
advocates frequently cite the high cost of intravenous (IV) antibiotics. See, e.g., Touched By Lyme: IVs 
Remain Financial Stumbling Block for Many Lyme Patients, LYMEDISEASE.ORG (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://lymedisease.org/news/touchedbylyme/ivabx.html. 
 196. See Monica Brady-Myerov, Lyme Disease on Rise as Mass. Seeks New Solutions, 90.9-
WBUR (BOSTON) (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.wbur.org/2011/08/08/lyme-disease. See also Open 
Letter from Daniel Cameron, supra note 136 (discussing the need for legislation to prevent health 
insurers from denying coverage for long-term antibiotic therapy based on ―NIH-sponsored‖ clinical 
trials, including those summarized in the IDSA guidelines). 
 197. See Brady-Myerov, supra note 196 (quoting a state representative who supports mandating 
insurance coverage for long-term antibiotics: ―The insurance companies are denying coverage for 
those people who are receiving the long-term antibiotic treatment and if they are not denying coverage 
they are making it very, very difficult for the payments to be made and sometimes the patients and 
their families kind of give up on it.‖). Brady-Myerov‘s article on the Boston NPR affiliate in 2011 
sparked its own Lyme-related controversy, acknowledged in an editorial rebuke attached to the 
original article:  
Listeners and readers of this story might conclude that the medical establishment is evenly 
split between those who support a diagnosis of ―chronic Lyme Disease‖ and those who do 
not. In fact, there is a strong consensus against that diagnosis as an explanation for the long-
lasting symptoms some patients experience, and against long-term antibiotics as treatment. 
The issue remains hotly debated publicly . . . . 
Id. 
 198. See supra Part II.A. 
 199. See Open Letter from Daniel Cameron, supra note 136.  
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neurologist.‖200 In contrast, Rhode Island‘s law contains a sweeping 
provision requiring ―coverage for diagnostic testing and long-term 
antibiotic treatment of chronic lyme disease,‖ and stipulating that 
―[t]reatment otherwise eligible for benefits pursuant to this section shall 
not be denied solely because such treatment may be characterized as 
unproven, experimental, or investigational in nature.‖201 
The combination of LLMD-protection laws and mandatory antibiotic 
coverage announces a definitive policy statement: evidence-based 
recommendations on Lyme disease treatment are to be disregarded by 
physicians and insurers. The next section argues that such legislative 
evisceration of clinical practice guidelines is highly problematic and 
represents a dangerous endorsement of the maximalist antibiotic treatment 
paradigm. 
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF LLMD-PROTECTION STATUTES 
LLMD-protection laws are problematic expressions of public health 
policy on the part of state governments for a number of reasons: (1) these 
laws protect antibiotic therapies that are needlessly dangerous to patients; 
(2) they weaken the authority of state medical boards and CPGs; and 
(3) they are counterproductive in the fight against antibiotic resistance. 
A. LLMD-Protection Statutes Protect Dangerous, Maximalist Antibiotic 
Therapies 
LLMD-protection laws protect—and arguably legitimize—treatment 
that not only contradicts the best available scientific evidence, but is also 
potentially dangerous to patients. ―Long-term antibiotic therapy‖ 
inherently conflicts with the treatment guidelines for Lyme disease.
202
 In 
exempting such a broad, poorly defined class of antibiotic therapies, 
LLMD-protection statutes do not even attempt to distinguish between 
various therapeutic options that may be more or less dangerous to patients. 
Further, by defining ―Lyme disease‖ so loosely, the laws ostensibly defer 
to the judgment of LLMDs to determine when a patient qualifies for the 
 
 
 200. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-492h (West 2011). 
 201. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-62 (2011) (listing certain limited-benefit health insurance policies, 
such as ―[a]ccident only‖ policies, that are exempt from this requirement); Id. § 27-41-65 (applying 
law to health maintenance organizations). See also STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, supra note 62 (―Rhode Island law protects Lyme disease patients by ensuring that they can 
receive proper treatment and that their insurance companies cover that treatment.‖). 
 202. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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protected antibiotic regimens.
203
 These two factors, open-ended antibiotic 
treatment strategies and poorly defined case definitions, are the essence of 
the antibiotic maximalism espoused by the LLMD community.
204
 
It is disingenuous for state lawmakers to declare that the new statutory 
protections ―do[] not protect any doctor who provides substandard 
care.‖205 This may be technically correct; physicians will still be held to 
the professional standard of care in malpractice suits. Yet, prescribing 
long-term antibiotic treatments to patients who are improperly diagnosed 
with Lyme disease is exactly the activity that has been described as 
potentially injurious, and even fatal, to patients.
206
 When interpreted 
narrowly, LLMD-protection statutes may not prevent medical boards from 
disciplining the most egregiously dangerous diagnostic and therapeutic 
practices by the most irresponsible LLMDs.
207
 However, politicians play a 
dangerous game when they sanction contraindicated and potentially 
dangerous therapies. Apart from their direct legal effect on physician 
discipline, LLMD-protection statutes signal legislative support for 
antibiotic maximalism that may tend to further legitimize this risky 
therapeutic paradigm.
208
 
B. LLMD-Protection Statutes Threaten the Authority of State Medical 
Boards and Clinical Practice Guidelines 
LLMD-protection laws disrupt the established regulatory framework 
wherein medical boards enforce professional standards consistently, 
 
 
 203. See supra Part III.B. 
 204. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 205. See Press Release, supra note 136. 
 206. See Stanek et al., supra note 79, at 9. 
 207. One recent case underscores this point. In Jones v. Conn. Medical Examining Bd., No. 
HHBCV106004778S, 2011 WL 2739448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011), a Connecticut LLMD appealed a 
state medical board order that found Jones had diagnosed Lyme disease in two minors and prescribed 
antibiotics to them, all without adequate physical examination of the patients. Although the statute was 
not in effect at the time charges were filed against the physician, the court seemed to indicate, in 
dictum, that the physician‘s failure to make an adequate differential diagnosis (i.e., without a physical 
examination of the patient) was not protected under the new LLMD statute. Id. n.5 (―Even if [the 
Connecticut LLMD-protection statute] were retroactive, this is not the sole basis for disciplinary action 
by the Board against Dr. Jones.‖). 
 208. In some regions with endemic Lyme disease, the belief is already widespread that ―chronic‖ 
Lyme disease persists beyond the IDSA-recommended course of antibiotics. Mark M. Macauda et al., 
Long-Term Lyme Disease Antibiotic Therapy Beliefs Among New England Residents, 11 VECTOR-
BORNE & ZOONOTIC DISEASES 857, 860 (2011) (reporting on a survey of residents in areas of 
Connecticut and Rhode Island indicating a majority of them ―believe that the Lyme disease 
[bacterium] can persist following antibiotic treatment, that a standard course of treatment for 2 to 4 
weeks is often not curative, and that long-term antibiotic therapy of >2 months is sometimes useful‖). 
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regardless of the disease context. These laws inject politics into 
professional codes, threatening the legitimacy of medical regulators. On 
this point, the particular political context of LLMD-protection legislation 
is revealing. Advocates of LLMDs and of the ―chronic‖ Lyme disease 
diagnosis believe that public health officials have conspired with other 
entities, including insurance companies, to deny necessary care.
209
 
Accordingly, they argue, state medical regulators are an undue restraint on 
patient and physician freedom.
210
 Similarly, those opposed to the 
perceived political liberalization of ―organized medicine,‖ including state 
medical boards, advocate for LLMD-protection statutes.
211
  
By repudiating the mainstream IDSA recommendations for Lyme 
disease treatment, LLMD-protection laws represent a political attack on 
evidence-based medicine itself. LLMDs and their advocates reject 
standardizing forces in medicine, decrying the ―paternalism‖ of clinical 
practice guidelines generally.
212
 Furthermore, even if the therapeutic 
claims of LLMDs had scientific merit, legislation is an inherently 
undesirable way of incorporating evidence into medical practice.
213
 
LLMD-protection statutes have been justified by what proponents describe 
as the still-evolving nature of Lyme research.
214
 Paradoxically, however, 
these statutes enshrine a legislative endorsement of long-term antibiotic 
therapy
 
that will require state legislators, rather than physician-regulators, 
to monitor progress in the field and update the law accordingly. This 
paradox underscores the fact that LLMD-protection statutes are not an 
 
 
 209. Auwaerter et al., supra note 19, at 716; supra Part II. 
 210. For instance, in signing the Connecticut LLMD-protection bill, then-Governor Jodi Rell 
proclaimed that Lyme disease patients ―must have the freedom to choose which treatment best meets 
their needs.‖ Press Release, Connecticut Department of Public Health, supra note 136. 
 211. Schlafly, supra note 137, at 80 (citing the ―unholy alliance‖ of ―organized medicine‖ groups, 
such as the Texas Medical Association and the American Medical Association, and Texas politicians 
who defeated the most radical plan, supported by the AAPS, to dismantle the regulatory oversight 
power of the Texas Medical Board). 
 212. See, e.g., Lorraine Johnson & Ralph Stricker, Treatment of Lyme Disease: A Medicolegal 
Assessment, 2 EXPERT REV. ANTI-INFECTIVE THERAPY 533, 548 (2004) (―Rigid guidelines that fail to 
consider patient preference or allow for the exercise of clinical discretion are inherently 
paternalistic.‖). 
 213. As one author has observed, ―[L]egislative mandates tied to specific technologies or 
treatments are inflexible, static, and not as easily changed as science advances.‖ Peter D. Jacobson, 
Commentary, Transferring Clinical Practice Guidelines Into Legislative Mandates: Proceed with 
Abundant Caution, 299 JAMA 208, 209 (2008). 
 214. See, e.g., Open Letter, supra note 136 (arguing ―[the LLMD protection law] will enable very 
ill [Connecticut] residents to choose treatment options that best meet their needs while the medical 
community works to find consensus on LD treatment guidelines‖ and citing a report indicating that 
―evidence [used to repudiate long-term antibiotic therapy] is too heterogeneous to make strong 
recommendations‖). 
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attempt to correct an evidentiary bias among medical regulators, but rather 
are an assault on the standardizing influence of evidence-based guidelines 
more generally. 
LLMD-protection statutes result from a movement that has turned to 
politics out of frustration with limitations in medical science. Indisputably, 
medicine has not been able to help those who believe Lyme disease causes 
their varied, often difficult-to-quantify maladies; medical science merely 
indicates that those symptoms are not, in fact, caused by Lyme disease.
215
 
That dissonance has fueled the passage of LLMD-protection statutes, as 
LLMDs and their advocates turn to the political sphere in an attempt to 
delegitimize the best available evidence on Lyme disease. However, 
society suffers when normative, value-laden positions (e.g., the desire to 
alleviate symptoms ascribed to ―chronic‖ Lyme disease) are disguised as 
positivist, evidence-based ones.
216
 By invoking politics and the law in an 
attempt to discredit evidence-based clinical guidelines and advance 
dangerous and unnecessary antibiotic therapies, politicians have 
dismantled an important firewall between the scientific process on the one 
hand, and normative political decision-making on the other.
217
 
C. LLMD-Protection Statutes Threaten the Fight Against Antibiotic 
Resistance 
Beyond their immediate implications for Lyme disease therapy, 
LLMD-protection statutes threaten the unique ability of state medical 
boards to address the growing threat of antibiotic resistance. Antibiotic use 
invokes competing individual and public-health considerations. Even 
when antibiotic use is warranted in the case of an individual patient, such 
use imposes external costs on others who may become infected by 
resistant bacteria.
218
 Relative to other regulators of physician behavior,
219
 
 
 
 215. See supra Part I.B. 
 216. Kraemer & Gostin, supra note 73, at 666–67 (writing critically of the Connecticut antitrust 
investigation into IDSA, Kraemer and Gostin criticize the chronic Lyme movement when their 
―normative views are passed off as positive assertions‖). The [chronic Lyme disase] advocacy 
community understandably seeks answers for the symptoms attributed to Lyme disease. But when 
high-quality research repeatedly was inconsistent with the group‘s hypotheses, the community should 
have sought other answers.‖ Id. 
 217. See id. (―A wall of separation is needed between science, norms, and politics.‖). 
 218. Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 611, 627 (2005). See also supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text (describing the problem of 
antibiotic resistance). 
 219. In particular, the medical malpractice liability paradigm is not fit to confront the population 
health problems posed by antibiotic resistance. See Saver, supra note 55, at 464. Apart from the issue 
of the standard of care (which may or may not impose sufficient limits on antibiotic use), a crucial 
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medical boards may be well situated to weigh such competing interests in 
antibiotics because of their duty to the public at large.
220
 However, LLMD-
protection statutes severely impede this potential function of medical 
boards by preventing them from disciplining physicians for prescribing 
contraindicated, maximalist antibiotic regimens. 
More generally, LLMD-protection statutes legitimize an individualist 
perspective of the doctor-patient relationship that contradicts the role of 
the physician, and the wider medical profession, in promoting the public 
health. State legislation favoring LLMDs responds to popular perceptions 
that the IDSA recommendations were not grounded in medical evidence 
but, instead, were created as instruments of cost-cutting and medical 
rationing.
221
 Yet, antibiotic resistance is one public health concern that will 
require physicians to serve as gatekeepers.
222
 In contrast, LLMD-
protection statutes legitimize a medical subculture that continues to 
express an unbridled commitment to using more and stronger 
antibiotics.
223
 
D. Is There a Better Way for Legislatures to Address the Conflict over 
Lyme Disease? 
For the reasons outlined above, LLMD-protection statutes are an 
aberration from sound medical policy and should be repealed promptly. 
Yet, is there a way for policymakers to appease those who believe that 
―chronic‖ Lyme disease requires long-term antibiotic therapy, without 
explicitly condoning dangerous therapies? The answer, unfortunately, is 
likely to be no. Short of undesirable measures, such as LLMD-protection 
laws, that legitimize the LLMD paradigm, political action seems unlikely 
 
 
problem is that a physician‘s duty is not likely to extend to third parties injured by resistant strains of 
bacteria. See id. at 464–65. 
 220. See Saver, supra note 55, at 469 (reasoning that if medical boards imposed greater controls 
over antibiotic usage, ―[s]uch an approach would seem to fit naturally within the licensure paradigm of 
evaluating individual practitioners for adherence to minimal standards of professional conduct in order 
to protect patients in the aggregate.‖). Saver adds the caveat, however, that ―[t]hreats to population 
health due to indiscriminate antibiotic prescribing would likely be seen by medical board officials as 
somewhat diffuse and attenuated compared to the more tangible, immediate dangers to patients arising 
from other licensure violations.‖ Id. at 470. 
 221. See supra Part II.A. 
 222. Saver, supra note 55, at 434–35. 
 223. In an argument that the pharmaceutical industry should pay more attention to chronic Lyme 
disease, leading LLMDs have claimed that expanded use of long-term antibiotic therapy should be a 
winning proposition for both patients and ―Big pharma.‖ Raphael B. Stricker & Lorraine Johnson, 
Lyme Disease: The Next Decade, 4 INFECTION & DRUG RESISTANCE 1, 4 (2011) (―The need for more 
effective treatment of this chronic infection in turn supports the use of more complex (and lucrative) 
antibiotic regimens in Lyme disease.‖).  
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to convince advocates of non-standard Lyme disease practice that medical 
regulators are taking them seriously. Admittedly, several states have 
passed legislation that, arguably, pays lip service to the chronic Lyme 
movement and may be effective in diffusing concerns that ―chronic‖ Lyme 
disease is ignored by the government.
224
 Similarly, proposed federal 
legislation would create a Tick-Borne Diseases Advisory Committee, 
stipulating that members must ―represent[] the broad spectrum of 
viewpoints held within the scientific community related to Lyme and other 
tick-borne diseases.‖225 However, the more steadfast opponents of medical 
standardization are likely to be disappointed by anything less than a 
comprehensive structural change to physician oversight.
226
 
At its base, the Lyme disease conflict may reflect the fact that cold 
scientific data has a hard time competing with compelling anecdotes about 
successful treatment.
227
 The controversy highlights the political 
weaknesses of evidence-based medicine, which relies on the ―biomedical 
model‖ of disease and, thus, may not adequately serve patients whose very 
real symptoms are caused by poorly defined factors.
228
 Reconciling 
divergent perspectives on medical evidence and the patient-physician 
relationship is absolutely vital as we move closer to the ―consumer health 
revolution,‖ whose advocates see the ―paternalism of the medical 
profession‖ as a major barrier to the democratization of health care.229 
Progress on this front will require much work from politicians, physicians, 
and patients. However, exempting dangerous therapy from regulatory 
 
 
 224.  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1645 (2011) (providing for an annual report on 
Lyme disease, including ―[a] summary or bibliography of peer-reviewed medical literature and studies 
related to the diagnosis, medical management and treatment of Lyme disease and other tick-borne 
illnesses, including, but not limited to, the recognition of chronic Lyme disease and the use of long-
term antibiotic treatment.‖) (emphasis added); N.J. STAT. ANN. 36:2-111 (West 2011) (―Lyme-
Disease Awareness Month‖); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 254.52 (West 2011) (directing the department of 
health to conduct research and collect data on Lyme disease). More entertaining proposals have also 
been put forward. In 2011, Rhode Island legislators introduced a bill that would designate a special 
scratch-off lottery ticket (named ―Scratch-A-Tick‖) to raise funds for Lyme disease research. H.R. 
5116/S. 134, 2011 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2011). 
 225. Lyme and Tick-Borne Disease Prevention, Education, and Research Act of 2011, S. 1381, 
112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2557, 112th Cong. (2011) (―To provide for the establishment of the Tick-
Borne Diseases Advisory Committee.‖). 
 226. See Schlafly, supra note 137, at 80 (2011) (―Taking power away from medical boards is the 
only way to guarantee improvement for freedom in medicine.‖). 
 227. Some commentators have argued that the medical community must find a way of 
communicating science in a way that competes with anecdote and narrative. E.g., Zachary F. Meisel & 
Jason Karlawish, Commentary, Narrative vs Evidence-Based Medicine—And, Not Or, 306 JAMA 
2022, 2023 (2011). 
 228. See Sigal & Hassett, supra note 66, at 609–10. 
 229. See Frank Moss, Op-ed, Our High-Tech Health-Care Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at 
A29 (advocating greater patient involvement in health-related decision-making). 
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oversight, as LLMD-protection laws do, is a blunt, inflexible, and 
alarmingly irresponsible response to the demands of a fringe group of 
physicians and their patients. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lyme disease, and the controversy surrounding its treatment, has 
precipitated an unprecedented response by state governments. LLMD-
protection statutes aim to protect a broad, poorly defined class of non-
standard antibiotic therapy for Lyme disease. In doing so, these laws put 
patients at risk by delegitimizing state medical regulators and evidence-
based Lyme disease treatment guidelines. Further, by explicitly endorsing 
the maximalist antibiotic paradigm, LLMD-protection laws are a step 
backward in the struggle against antibiotic resistance. Any discussion of 
Lyme disease must acknowledge the suffering of those individuals who 
believe they suffer from ―chronic‖ Lyme disease. Yet, recent enactment of 
LLMD-protection statutes by several states endangers the very patients 
those states aim to serve. 
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